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YEAR IN REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Year in Review contains brief summaries of selected decisions
by the Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Court of Appeals.
The primary purpose of this review is to familiarize practitioners
with significant decisions handed down by these courts in 1995.
The summaries focus on the substantive areas of the law addressed,
the statutes or common law principles interpreted and the essence
of each of the holdings. Space does not permit review of all cases
decided by the courts this year, but the authors have attempted to
highlight decisions signaling a departure from prior law or resolving
issues of first impression. The cases that were omitted applied
well-settled principles of law or involved narrow holdings of limited
import. The appendix lists the omitted cases. Attorneys are
advised not to rely upon the information contained in this review
without further reference to the cases cited.
The opinions have been grouped according to general subject
matter rather than by the nature of the underlying claims. The
summaries are presented in the following fourteen areas of the law:
administrative, business, civil procedure, constitutional, criminal,
election, employment, environmental, family, permanent fund
dividend, property, tax, torts and trusts and estates.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. General
In State ex rel. Dew v. Superior Court,' the Alaska Supreme
Court held that where the state files a paternity action pursuant to
the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act ("SSCRA")2 on behalf
of a mother or a minor child, the state, rather than the superior
court, must initially compensate counsel appointed to represent the
defendant3 The superior court had determined that former
Copyright @ 1996 by Alaska Law Review
1. 907 P.2d 14 (Alaska 1995).
2. The SSCRA provides that a member of the armed services is entitled to
appointed counsel before a default judgment is entered against him or her. Id at
15 n.2.
3. Id. at 15.
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Administrative Rule 12(d)(2)(B)(vii),4 then applicable, authorized
the court to order the state to advance fees for SSCRA-appointed
counsel. The state argued that the superior court should advance
the compensation because there was no statutory authority for a
court to order the state to make such a payment. The supreme
court disagreed, holding that the determination of who advances
SSCRA counsel fees is a matter of "practice and procedure" in
courts and that former Administrative Rule 12(d)(2)(B)(vii)
granted the courts the power to make that determination.5
In Alaska Public Utilities Commission v. Municipality of
Anchorage,6 the supreme court held that the Alaska Public
Utilities Commission ("APUC") has implied statutory authority to
order telephone utilities to return to consumers a portion of the
revenues the utilities gained by charging rates not filed with and set
by APUC.7 However, because APUC's implied statutory authority
was limited to setting "just and reasonable" rates, it had no power
to make the utilities refund moneys beyond that which would make
the rate "reasonable."8  To penalize a utility company further,
APUC must use the civil sanction provided by Alaska Statutes
section 42.05.571.'
The court cited public policy reasons and similar rulings by
other courts for its holding that APUC had statutory authority to
require a refund. The policy reasons most persuasive to the court
were that (1) the telephone companies would have no incentive to
comply with APUC filing requirements if APUC could not directly
refund revenues to customers and (2) such a refund provides a
quick, easy way to compensate consumers.'0
4. Former Administrative Rule 12(d)(2)(B)(vii) has been amended and
renumbered as Administrative Rule 12(c)(2) (1994). The former rule provided
that courts may appoint attorneys "for absent service persons pursuant to the
[SSCRA] when the opposing party is financially unable to pay for such representa-
tions." Id at 15 n.4.
5. Id. (quoting ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15).
6. 902 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1995).
7. Id. at 784-85.
8. Id. at 789.
9. Id.; ALASKA STAT. § 42.05.571 (1989) (providing for a maximum penalty
of $100 to be levied against public utilities for each violation of chapter 42 of the
Alaska Statutes).
10. Alaska Pub. UtiL Comm'n, 902 P.2d at 788.
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In Lazy Mountain Land Club v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough
Board of Adjustment and Appeals," the supreme court held that
municipalities, pursuant to Alaska Statutes sections 29.40.030(b)
and 29.40.040, must adopt and validly enact comprehensive plans
before adopting zoning regulations. 2 The court noted that the
"'logic' of requiring planning to precede... individual land use
decisions" was already present in the context of public land
management. Thus, the court extended the logic to the context of
municipal land use management.
3
Lazy Mountain Land Club ("LMLC") desired to operate land
as a disposal site for construction and demolition wastes, but it was
denied a conditional use permit required by a municipal zoning
ordinance, Matanuska-Susitna Borough Code section 17.60.030.1
In the supreme court, LMLC argued that the zoning ordinance was
invalid because it was not enacted pursuant to a comprehensive
plan that itself had been enacted by ordinance. Although "the
Matanuska-Susitna Borough Comprehensive Development Plan,"
which the borough claimed constituted a "comprehensive plan,"
was adopted as a resolution rather than an ordinance,'5 the court
found that the "plan was validly enacted when it was incorporated
by reference into a later borough ordinance." 6 As a result, the
borough's zoning ordinance was valid.
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Coffey, 7 the supreme court
held that the Municipality of Anchorage Police and Fire Retire-
ment Board had incorrectly concluded that a claimant's disability
was non-occupational." Under the substantial evidence test, the
court would have deferred to the Board's decision if conflicting
medical opinions on the claimant's condition had existed. 9
11. 904 P.2d 373 (Alaska 1995).
12. Id. at 378-79; ALASKA STAT. §§ 29.40.030(b), 29A0.040 (1992).
13. Lazy Mountain Land Club, 904 P.2d at 378.
14. Id. at 376. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Code section 17.60.030 requires a
conditional land use permit for land uses that are "potentially damaging to the
property values and usefulness of adjacent properties and/or potentially harmful
to the public health, safety and welfare," including the land uses of "junkyards and
refuse areas." Id.
15. Id. at 381.
16. Id. at 381-82. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Code section 15.24.030(B)
incorporated the 1970 plan by reference. Id.
17. 893 P.2d 722 (Alaska 1995).
18. Id. at 724.
19. Id. at 728.
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However, since every opinion stated that the claimant's injury was
occupational, substantial evidence supported a conclusion opposite
to that of the Board.20
B. Open Meetings Act
In Revelle v. Marston,2' the Alaska Supreme Court applied
the test set out in Alaska Community Colleges' Federation of
Teachers, Local No. 2404 v. University of Alaska' for determining
the appropriate remedy in the event of a decision made in violation
of the Open Meetings Act.' The Mayor of Anchorage terminat-
ed Revelle as Head Librarian for the municipality based upon an
evaluation by the Library Advisory Board, which occurred at a
meeting that was found to be in violation of the Open Meetings
Act.24 The superior court applied the Federation of Teachers test,
which states that when full and fair reconsideration of a decision
made in violation of the Open Meetings Act is impossible without
invalidating it, the court must perform a balancing test to determine
whether invalidation of the decision is in the public interest.2
5
The test required the court to weigh the "remedial benefits to be
gained in light of the goals of the [Open Meetings Act] against the
prejudice likely to accrue to the public., 26 The superior court
ordered Revelle reinstated for a 120-day cooling-off period to allow
for a reevaluation of Revelle's performance.27 However, it did not
award him the back pay and benefits he sought; after applying the
Federation of Teachers test, it ruled that such an award would not
be consistent with the public interest.2
The supreme court found that in denying the award, the
superior court had considered only the public's right to be informed
as a goal of the Act, thus determining that awarding back pay and
benefits to an individual were unrelated to this goal.29 The
supreme court stated that maximizing informed and principled
20. Id.
21. 898 P.2d 917 (Alaska 1995).
22. 677 P.2d 886 (Alaska 1984).
23. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310(a) (1993).
24. Revelle, 898 P.2d at 919-20.
25. Id. at 922.
26. Id. (quoting Alaska Community Colleges' Federation of Teachers, Local
No. 2404 v. University of Alaska, 677 P.2d 886, 893 (Alaska 1984)).
27. Id at 920.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 922.
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decision-making and deterring future violations were also goals of
the Act. The court held that the superior court should have taken
these goals into account when balancing the "remedial benefits to
be gained" in light of the goals of the Open Meetings Act against
the likely prejudice to the public, and remanded the issue of back
pay and benefits for such consideration."
In Von Stauffenberg v. Committee For an Honest and Ethical
School Board,3' the supreme court concluded that allegations
contained in a recall petition failed to state legally sufficient
grounds to recall certain elected municipal officials.32 The Com-
mittee for an Honest and Ethical School Board sought to remove
from office five members of the Haines Borough School Board,
alleging in their recall petition that the Board members committed
misconduct by convening in a closed door executive session to
consider retaining the borough's elementary school principal.33
The court noted that although government meetings are required
to be open under the Alaska Open Meetings Act,34 the statute
makes an exception for "subjects that tend to prejudice the
reputation and character of any person."35 The court held that
because "there is no law which precludes public officials from
discussing sensitive personnel matters in closed door executive
sessions,"" the Committee's grounds for recall did not allege a
violation of law and, therefore, lacked sufficient particularity.37
C. Fish and Game
In Kodiak Seafood Processors Ass'n v. State,38 the Alaska
Supreme Court determined that the Commissioner of the Alaska
Department of Fish and Game could allow a private fisher, who
had participated in an experimental fishing operation, to keep and
sell fish caught during the operation as consideration for his
participation.39 The court's interpretation expands the Commis-
30. Id. at 923-25.
31. 903 P.2d 1055 (Alaska 1995).
32. Id. at 1060.
33. Id. at 1057.
34. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310 (1993).
35. Id. § 44.62.310(c)(2).
36. 903 P.2d at 1060 n.13.
37. Id. at 1060.
38. 900 P.2d 1191 (Alaska 1995).
39. Id. at 1197.
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sioner's authority under Alaska Statutes section 16.05.050(15),40
which explicitly allows the Commissioner to sell any fish caught
during test fishing operations and to give the proceeds to a private
fisher as consideration for participating in the test.
41
Kodiak Seafood Processors Association ("KSPA") appealed
from a summary judgment order declining to enjoin a private fisher
from dredging for scallops in an area closed to commercial scallop
fishing.42 This dredging had been authorized by a special permit
issued to the private fisher by the Commissioner.' KSPA argued
that by allowing the fisher to keep and sell the fish, the Commis-
sioner's issuance of the permit was a de facto regulation that
illegally opened a commercial fishery for a single person.44 The
court disagreed, reasoning that "[t]here is no material difference
between allowing the private fisher to sell the catch and having the
Commissioner sell the catch and give the proceeds to the private
fisher."'4
In Peninsula Marketing Ass'n v. Rosier,46 the supreme court
held that the emergency powers of the Commissioner of the
Department of Fish and Game, outside the context of a true
biological emergency, did not implicitly include a general veto
power over decisions of the Board of Fisheries.47 The court
concluded that inferring such a broad veto power from the
statutory grant of emergency power would conflict with other
statutory provisions. Specifically, it would nullify explicit statutory
grants of power, render useless the statutory provisions dividing
power and authority between the Commissioner and the Board and
make meaningless the statutory device for resolving conflicts
between the two.4' In other words, if such powers were inferred,
the Board would become a "rubber stamp or advisory body for the
Commissioner., 49 On the face of this case, the court found that
the Board had effectively made a final determination not to lower
the chum salmon harvest cap, as proposed by the Commissioner,
40. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.050(15) (1992).
41. Kodiak Seafood Processors Ass'n, 900 P.2d at 1197.
42. Id. at 1193.
43. Id,
44. Id. at 1197.
45. Id.
46. 890 P.2d 567 (Alaska 1995).
47. Id. at 573; ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.060(a), (b) (1992).




because a majority of the Board voted to approve a fishery
management plan without any chum cap reduction. ° The court
held that the Commissioner could not use his emergency powers to
institute a reduced cap in the absence of new information or events
not considered by the Board."'
D. Local Boundary Commission
In Petitioners for Incorporation of City and Borough of Yakutat
v. Local Boundary Commission,52 the supreme court held that
Alaska Statutes section 29.05.100(a) 3 -requires the Local Boundary
Commission ("LBC") to make a preliminary finding that the
boundaries of a proposed borough do not comply with statutory
standards before it may alter those boundaries. 4 In addition, the
court held that the LBC could find such non-compliance if the
proposed boundaries do not "maximize common interests"
pursuant to the Alaska Constitution,5 which requires that each
borough "embrace an area and population with common interests
to the maximum degree possible. 5 6  In determining whether
common interests are maximized, the LBC has broad discretion. 7
In the present case, the LBC shifted the boundaries for the
proposed Borough of Yakutat because it believed that portions of
the proposed area lacked sufficient ties to other parts of the
proposed borough and had more in common with another area5
The court concluded that by shifting the boundaries, the LBC made
an implied finding that the originally proposed boundaries did not
maximize common interests. 9 Therefore, the LBC acted within
its authority when it altered the boundaries.
In Keane v. Local Boundary Commission,60 the supreme court
interpreted Alaska Statutes section 29.05.021(b) 61 to hold that
50. Md at 574.-
51. Id.
52. 900 P.2d 721 (Alaska 1995).
53. ALAsKA STAT. § 29.05.100(a) (1992).
54. Yakutat, 900 P.2d at 725.
55. Id.
56. ALAsKA CONST. art. X, § 3.
57. Yakuta4 900 P.2d at 726.
58. Id. at 726-27.
59. Id. at 727.
60. 893 P.2d 1239 (Alaska 1995).
61. Alaska Statutes section 29.05.021(b) provides: "A community within a
borough may not incorporate as a city if the services to be provided by the
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when a community proposes to incorporate, the LBC must inquire
into the reasonableness of having the borough within which the
community is located provide necessary services. If the provision
of services by the borough is reasonable and practicable, the
borough should provide them and the application for incorporation
should be denied.62 However, the court explicitly stated that this
interpretation of section 29.05.021(b) should not be construed to
mean that a city should only be incorporated when it is impossible
for a borough to provide services.63 This would leave the LBC
powerless to approve the incorporation of any new city that is
located within an organized borough.' Moreover, the court
emphasized the existence of both statutory and constitutional
preferences for the incorporation of cities over the establishment
of new service areas.65 The court remanded the case to the LBC





In Von Gemmingen v. First National Bank of Anchorage ("Von
Gemmingen II"),67 the Alaska Supreme Court clarified its earlier
holding in Von Gemmingen v. First National Bank of Anchorage
("Von Gemmingen J")6' by holding that a debtor's judgment
creditor could recover from a bank only the amount of the debtor's
interest in an escrow account held by the bank.69 In Von Gem-
mingen II, First National Bank of Anchorage held escrow accounts
in the names of various judgment creditors of the debtors. The
debtors, in turn, had assigned the proceeds from these accounts to
various other creditors. Von Gemmingen, a judgment creditor of
the debtors, served a writ of attachment on the bank. The bank
proposed city can be provided on an areawide or nonareawide basis by the
borough in which the proposed city is located .. .
62. Keane, 893 P.2d at 1244.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1244 n.1O.
65. Id. at 1244.
66. Id at 1246.
67. 890 P.2d 60 (Alaska 1995).
68. 789 P.2d 353 (Alaska 1990).
69. Von Gemmingen, 890 P.2d at 60.
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continued to honor the prior assignments and to charge its regular
escrow fees. It applied any surplus funds in the escrow accounts to
the benefit of the judgment creditor.70
Von Gemmingen challenged the bank's handling of the
accounts, asserting the right to the full amount paid into the levied
accounts. The bank argued that Von Gemmingen was entitled only
to the amount in the accounts remaining after payment was made
to the prior assignee-creditors and service charges were satisfied.71
The court agreed with the bank's interpretation, noting that the
assignment of the debtors' rights in the escrow account modified
the interests of the judgment debtors in the escrow account and
excluded the amount assigned from subsequent attachment by
judgment creditors.72
B. Insurance
In Maynard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,73
the supreme court held that an insurance company may seek
reimbursement for medical expenses paid to an insured where (1)
the medical expenses were incurred as a result of action by a
tortfeasor, (2) the insurer also represents the tortfeasor and (3) the
insured brings an action against the tortfeasor seeking compensa-
tion for the same medical expenses.74 Alaska case law traditional-
ly prohibited insurance companies from seeking subrogation against
their own insureds.' This rule was based on cases involving
situations "in which the insurer paid out a loss to its insured and
then sought to hold a second coinsured party under the same
contract liable for the loss. ' '76 The Maynard court distinguished
those prior cases which, unlike Maynard, did not involve two
separate insurance policies-that of the injured party and that of
the tortfeasor.77 The language of one of the policies in Maynard,
that between Maynard and the insured, specifically provided that
the insurer was entitled to reimbursement to the extent that
Maynard recovered from a third party for medical expenses.
70. Id. at 61.
71. Id. at 63.
72. Id.
73. 902 P.2d 1328 (Alaska 1995).
74. Id. at 1333.




Moreover, the court found that the existence of two insurance
policies minimized the potential for conflicts of interest, which were
of concern in prior cases dealing with subrogation by an insurance
company against its own insureds. In those prior cases, there was
a great danger that an insurance company would abuse its fiduciary
obligations with respect to a coinsured's duty to cooperate with the
insurance company's investigation of a claim under a policy.
Conflicts of interest arose because the insurance company might
use information discovered as a result of one coinsured's duty to
cooperate to establish the liability of another coinsured under the
same policy. However, in Maynard, the court found that potential
conflicts of interest were not as great because under Maynard's
policy, the insurance company was automatically entitled to
reimbursement of any medical expenses recovered by Maynard.
The court reasoned that any investigation by the insurance
company would be limited to determining the amount and
reasonableness of medical expenses, and thus there was little
chance that conflicts of interest would arise.7" Finally, the court
concluded that it would not be equitable to preclude the insurance
company from seeking reimbursement because that would permit
the insured to receive double recovery for the medical expenses.
79
In Fulton v. Lloyds," the supreme court held that where two
insurance companies underwrote the same policy, both were liable
if either violated any duty it owed to the insured.8 ' Because there
was only one policy issued and the insured paid only one premium,
the insured "reasonably would expect both insurers to be responsi-
ble for and bound by decisions made in the direction of litigation
or negotiations."' While the two insurance companies might have
had a different private understanding, such an understanding
"would do nothing to change the impression conveyed by the
language of the policy that there would be only one defense to
which both insurers would be bound since there was only one
policy.' s
78. Id. at 1331-33.
79. Id at 1334.
80. 903 P2d 1062 (Alaska 1995).
81. The first insurance company covered the first $200,000 of the policy, and
the second insurance company provided $300,000 in excess insurance. Ia. at 1064.




In Columbia Mutual Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.," the supreme court reaffirmed its
decision in Werley v. United Services Automobile Ass'n85 that
where "other insurance" clauses86 conflict, the loss is prorated
between the insurers up to their respective policy limits." State
Farm Insurance Co. insured a car owned by Jackie Lee. Lee
permitted Jim Burks, Sr., who was insured by Columbia Mutual
Insurance Co., to drive the car. While driving the car, Burks
collided with a motorcycle carrying two persons. The insurance
policy underwritten by Columbia contained an "other insurance"
clause that provided coverage only in excess of "other collectible
insurance" if Burks had an accident driving a car he did not
own.88 In contrast, the State Farm policy stated that it covered
only a prorated share of any loss resulting from an accident
involving Lee's car.89
The supreme court concluded that these policies conflicted
because neither policy provided "primary" insurance. 0 Because
the polices conflicted, the court concluded that Werley controlled,
and the loss had to be prorated. In determining how the loss
should be prorated, the court determined that it should be shared
on a per-accident basis.9' That is, because two people were
injured, State Farm was potentially liable for $200,000, its per
person policy limit, while Columbia was potentially liable for
$110,000. According to the court's per accident calculation, the
total coverage was $310,000, and Columbia was liable for 11/31 of
it. 92
In Johnson & Higgins of Alaska, Inc. v. Blomfield,93 the
supreme court held that expert testimony is not necessary to
84. 905 P.2d 474 (Alaska 1995).
85. 498 P.2d 112 (Alaska 1972).
86. An "other insurance" clause is a clause in an insurance policy that limits
coverage when other insurance policies also provide coverage. The "other
insurance" clauses may conflict when, by their terms, they purport to limit
insurance because of the existence of one another. See Columbia Mut. Ins. Co.,




90. 1& at 477.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 907 P.2d 1371 (Alaska 1995).
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determine whether an insurance agent was professionally negligent
in advising a customer about an insurance policy because an
insurance agent's work qualified as a "non-technical [field] where
negligence is evident to lay people.
9 4
In D.D. v. Insurance Co. of North America,95 the supreme
court determined that a physician is entitled to coverage and legal
representation pursuant to his business owner's insurance policy if
he is sued for referring a patient to a colleague in his building who
sexually assaults her.96 The plaintiff alleged that Dr. Erkmann
was negligent as a business owner because he knew or should have
known that the referred doctor had a history of inappropriate
sexual behavior with patients. Since the complaint alleged facts
that gave rise to a possibility that Erkmann would be liable under
his business owners policy, the court found that Erkmann's insurer
had a contractual duty to represent him.9 7 The court also found
that a gynecologist's sexual assault of a patient does not "arise out
of medical treatment," and therefore did not fall under the
insurance policy's exclusion of injuries "arising out of... medical
... treatment." 98
C. Contracts
In Bauman v. Day,99 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the
"discovery rule" should be applied to determine the beginning of
the statute of limitations in common law contract claims. The
plaintiffs purchased property from the defendants in 1984, unaware
that it had permafrost-related problems."° Though the problem
was discovered in 1988, the plaintiffs did not bring suit until
1992.101 Because the statute of limitations for common law
contract claims was six years, the claim would be time-barred if the
statute of limitations began at the time of breach rather than at the
time of discovery." The court found that policy reasons favored
adopting the discovery rule for common law contract claims.
94. Id. at 1374 (quoting Kendall v. State, 692 P.2d 953, 955 (Alaska 1984)).
95. 905 P.2d 1365 (Alaska 1995).
96. Id. at 1368.
97. Id. at 1367-68.
98. Id. at 1368-70.
99. 892 P.2d 817 (Alaska 1995).
100. I. at 820.
101. Id. at 828.
102. Id. at 822.
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Specifically, the court concluded that the defendant should not
benefit from the plaintiff's ignorance simply because the breach is
difficult to ascertain. 3
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Marion Equipment Co.,"°4
the supreme court held that the Alaska "anti-indemnity" stat-
ute0 5 applies to leases of construction equipment, rendering
indemnity agreements in such leases unenforceable."°  Marion
had leased a construction hoist to Howard S. Wright Construction
Company, a general contractor. A component of the hoist crushed
the arm of James Crane, a subcontractor's employee."° After
defending and settling Crane's lawsuit against Wright, Aetna
brought an indemnity claim against Marion pursuant to an
indemnity provision in the hoist lease agreement between Marion
and Wright.'08
The court found that the "anti-indemnity" statute, which
governed agreements "contained in, collateral to, or affecting"
construction contracts, applied to the equipment lease in ques-
tion.' 9 The court based its finding on an analysis of the weight of
authority in other states with similar anti-indemnity statutes, the
language of the Marion-Wright lease and the "anti-indemnity"
statute's goal of increasing safety at construction sites."0
After concluding that the anti-indemnity statute was applicable,
the court concluded that the statute rendered Aetna's indemnity
claim unenforceable because Aetna sought indemnity for an injury
that resulted from Wright's "wilful misconduct" and "sole negli-
gence.""' The court held that "wilful misconduct" in the context
of the statute means "volitional action taken either 'with a
knowledge that serious injury to another will probably result, or
103. Id at 828.
104. 894 P.2d 664 (Alaska 1995).
105. ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.900 (1994) (prohibiting indemnification agreements
in construction contracts that "purporto to indemnify the promisee against liability
for damages ... arising ... from the sole negligence or wilful misconduct of the
promisee or the promisee's agents.").
106. Marion Equip. Co., 894 P.2d at 666-70.
107. Id. at 665.
108. Id. at 666.
109. Id. at 666-70 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.900 (1994)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 670.
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with wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results'." '
Because the jury found that Wright showed reckless indifference to
the employee's interests and safety, the court concluded that
Wright's conduct constituted wilful misconduct."'
In Stonnont v. Astoria, Ltd.,"4 the supreme court examined
a lease and option to purchase badly deteriorated property
including an eleven-unit apartment complex. Two months after
leasing the property from Astoria, Stormont received notice from
the City of Fairbanks that the apartment complex would be
demolished," whereupon Stormont sought rescission of the
contract on the basis of mistake, frustration and misrepresenta-
tion."6 Astoria counterclaimed for past due lease payments."17
The supreme court rejected Stormont's argument that neither
party had anticipated the demolition of the building, stating that
errors concerning future events do not justify rescission."' The
court separately considered Stormont's allegations that the parties
were mistaken about the severity of the building's problems. 9
Although the court found that the building's suitability for
commercial leasing went to the heart of the contracts, the court
held that because Stormont accepted the premises in "as is"
condition, it was not clear that he received something "fundamen-
tally different from What the parties believed he would."'" The
court further held that the presence of numerous "as is" clauses in
the contracts suggested that Stormont agreed to bear the risk of
mistake.12 '
The court noted that frustration is an affirmative defense in
which the party pleading it bears the burden of proof." Ac-
knowledging that allocation of risks is an important consideration
when such a defense is pleaded, the court concluded that although
112. Id. at 671 (quoting Rost v. United States, 803 F.2d 448, 450 (9th Cir.
1986)).
113. Id
114. 889 P.2d 1059 (Alaska 1995).
115. Id. at 1060.
116. Id. at 1059-60.
117. Id. at 1060.
118. Id. at 1061 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 cmt. a
(1981)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1061-62.
121. Id. at 1062.
122. Id. at 1063.
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the contracts did not explicitly mention demolition, Stormont had
assumed the risk that the building would not be suitable for his
purposes."3 Therefore, the court held that Stormont had not met
his burden of proving frustration. 24
In Kopanuk v. AVCP Regional Housing Authority,125 the
supreme court held that a hybrid Housing and Urban Development
("HUD") program contract created at least potential equitable
interests in the home buyer and therefore was outside of the
district court's jurisdiction." s  Kopanuk had entered into an
agreement with the Association of Village Council Presidents
Regional Housing Authority entitled a "Mutual Help and Occupan-
cy Agreement" ("MHOA") as part of a HUD-sponsored pro-
gram." In 1992, the Association initiated a forcible entry and
detainer action seeking to evict Kopanuk for an alleged breach of
the MHOA.'P Kopanuk argued that the contract was an install-
ment contract for the sale of land rather than a lease agreement
with an option to purchase, and therefore equitable interests were
at stake. 29 The supreme court decided that although HUD
described the program as a lease, the contract created potential
equitable interests, which precluded the district court from hearing
the case. Specifically, the court suggested that equity might exist
since the program required a non-refundable contribution of land
as a type of down payment (in this case contributed by a Native
corporation), and also that a person who maintains land over a
number of years may have equity in the appreciated value of the
property. 3'
In Wholesale B. V v. State,'31 the supreme court explained its
earlier order affirming a superior court's order that allowed the
Anchorage International Airport ("AIA") to cancel its solicitation
of bids for the duty-free concession at the airport.32 AIA had
123. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 265 cmt. a (1981)).
124. Id.
125. 902 P.2d 813 (Alaska 1995).
126. Id. at 817. District courts do not have jurisdiction over "actions of an
equitable nature, except as otherwise provided by law." ALASKA STAT.
§ 22.15.050 (2) (1988).
127. Kopanuk, 902 P.2d at 815.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 816.
130. Id. at 817.
131. 908 P.2d 994 (Alaska 1995).
132. Id. at 995.
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sought bids and decided to award the contract to the second-
highest bidder, determining that the high bidder lacked sufficient
retail experience. 33 The high bidder protested that the bidding
requirements were ambiguous and that there was an appearance of
impropriety." 4 In response, AIA cancelled bid solicitation and
rejected all bids, claiming that such action was "in the best interest
of the State" in light of the allegations of ambiguity and impropri-
ety together with the high costs and delays associated with
resolving those allegations.13 The supreme court acknowledged
that AIA's discretion to cancel bid solicitation is broad,' 36 but
refused to rule whether ambiguity alone would have justified its
doing so. Furthermore, the court agreed with AIA that continuing
the bid solicitation process was not in the state's best interest due
to the combined effect of the ambiguity in the bidding require-
ments, the admitted appearance of impropriety and the state's
interest in protecting public confidence in the bidding process.'
Because awarding a contract would not have been in the state's
best interest and because AIA had broad discretion to cancel a
solicitation for bids in such circumstances, the supreme court




In Hofmann v. von Wirth,"'39 the Alaska Supreme Court held
that prejudgment interest should not be added to civil damages
until a demand for payment is made. At trial, the superior court
ordered Hofmann to reimburse von Wirth for one-half of the
expenses she had incurred in maintaining a piece of property that
the formerly married couple held as tenants in common 40 In
addition, the trial court assessed prejudgment interest against
Hofmann for the amounts expended.'
133. Id. at 996.
134. Id. at 997.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 999 (citing 17 ALAsKA ADMiN. CODE tit. 40, § 340(e)(5) (1995)).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1004.
139. 907 P.2d 454 (Alaska 1995).




The supreme court stated that interest is owed by a debtor
from the date the debt is due or the debtor refuses to pay.'42
Because Hofmann was unaware of the payments made by von
Wirth, he cannot be said to have failed his obligation to pay for the
upkeep of the property until a demand was made which gave him
notice of his debt.43 The court held that a demand was necessary
for interest to begin to accrue and remanded the case to determine
when such demand was made.144
In Jackinsky v. Jackinsky,'45 the supreme court held that a
declaratory judgment action has no res judicata effect where (1)
there was never any "actual litigation of the issues"'" or (2) the
conduct giving rise to a subsequent suit post-dates the conclusion
of the earlier action. 47 In 1985, the Jackinsky family filed suit
against Timothy Jackinsky to obtain a declaratory judgment that
Timothy held a certain shore fishery lease in trust for the family.
The suit was settled by a court order entitled "stipulation to
dismiss" which provided that Timothy would transfer the lease to
another member of the Jackinsky family,"s In 1992, Timothy and
Sara Jackinsky filed suit against various other members of the
Jackinsky family, claiming an interest in the shore fishery leases
held by those members. Those family members moved to dismiss
the suit by arguing that under the doctrine of res judicata, the 1992
suit was barred by the 1985 suit. 49
The supreme court cited sections 33 and 27 of the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments in ruling that only "the determination of
actually litigated issues will have preclusive effect in later litiga-
tion,'' 50 and that "an issue is actually litigated when it is raised
and submitted for determination."'' Thus, based on these
principles, the 1984 suit did not bar the 1992 suit because the suit
was never litigated; it was settled.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 456.
144. Id. at 457.
145. 894 P.2d 650 (Alaska 1995).
146. Id. at 655 (quoting Dale v. Greater Anchorage Borough, 439 P.2d 790
(Alaska 1968)).
147. Id. at 656 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. f
(1982)).
148. Id. at 652.
149. Id. at 653.
150. Id. at 655.
151. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. d (1982)).
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The court also concluded that the 1992 suit was not barred by
the 1984 suit because the events underlying the 1992 suit occurred
after the 1984 suit was settled. Because the parties could not have
had a fair opportunity to litigate those new facts in 1984, it would
not be appropriate to preclude the litigation of them in 1992.152
Finally, the court concluded that because the 1984 settlement
agreement addressed only Timothy's transfer of his lease, it did not
manifest an intent to resolve any issues relevant to the 1992 suit,
and therefore had no res judicata effect.5 3
In Alaska Telecom, Ina v. Schafer,"4 the supreme court held
that Alaska's long-arm statute'55 is co-extensive with the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment5 6 by virtue of its
catch-all clause, which states that the statute's jurisdictional grounds
are "cumulative and in addition to any other grounds provided by
the common law."'5 7 Thus, in borderline personal jurisdiction
cases that do not fit within the grounds explicitly described in the
statute, courts must construe Alaska's jurisdiction according to the
due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Therefore, (1) the defendant must have minimum contacts with the
forum state, and (2) the maintenance of the suit must be consistent
with fair play and substantial justice.'59 In Schafer's case, suffi-
cient minimum contacts existed because Schafer had formed a
contract with an Alaskan, solicited a contract with an Alaskan
entity, negotiated by telephone to Alaska, executed the written
contract in Alaska, performed a significant portion of his services
under the contract in Alaska, mailed his invoices to Alaska for
payment and been paid by checks drawn on an Alaskan bank.16°
Maintenance of the suit in Alaska was consistent with notions of
fair play and substantial justice because, where Schafer's business
activities showed that doing business with an Alaska entity was not
burdensome, it followed that responding to a lawsuit in Alaska
would not be unreasonably burdensome. 6'
152. Id. at 656-57.
153. Id. at 655.
154. 888 P.2d 1296 (Alaska 1995).
155. ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.015 (1994).
156. Schafer, 888 P.2d at 1299; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
157. Id ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.015(c) (1994).
158. Schafer, 888 P.2d at 1299.
159. Id. at 1300-01.




In Bromley v. Mitchell,62 the supreme court held that
although a domiciliary of a state is generally entitled to litigate in
the state of his or her domicile,"6' in order to withstand a claim
of forum non conveniens, the individual must make at least a
minimum showing that it is more convenient to litigate in the state
of domicile than in another."6 Mitchell, a Washington resident,
sued Bromley, an Alaska resident, in Washington for unpaid
repairs on a boat Bromley had purchased.'" Bromley then sued
Mitchell in Alaska superior court for breach of contract on the sale
of the boat." Having won his case in Washington, Mitchell filed
motions for summary judgment and dismissal because of forum non
conveniens in Alaska. 67 The superior court -dismissed Bromley's
claim.168
In affirming the dismissal, the supreme court examined five
factors relevant in a forum non conveniens determination: "(1)
ease of access to proof; (2) availability and cost of witnesses; (3) the
possibility that the forum was chosen to harass; (4) the enforceabili-
ty of the judgment; and (5) the burden on the community of
litigating matters not of local concern."' 69 The court noted that
the superior court had properly considered these factors and found
none of them weighed in Bromley's favor. 7' The court also
reasoned that, although the doctrine remains applicable when the
plaintiff is a domiciliary, forum non conveniens motions are
generally granted only in exceptional cases.'7' The plaintiff's
choice of forum will be honored only when the plaintiff makes "a
real showing of convenience."' Bromley made no such show-
ing.1
73
162. 902 P.2d 797 (Alaska 1995).
163. Id. at 802.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 799.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 799-800.
169. Id. at 801 (citing Crowson v. Sealaska Corp., 705 P.2d 905, 908 (Alaska
1985)).
170. I. at 802.
171. Id. at 800.




In State v. United Cook Inlet Drift Ass'n,74 the supreme
court rejected the Mendoza exception 5 as a valid exception to
the state's ability to raise non-mutual offensive collateral estop-
pel." 6 The court distinguished the current application of the
exception, which applies to litigation involving the federal govern-
ment, from its proposed application to litigation involving the state.
Currently, the exception applies where: (1) it is desirable to have
several courts of appeals consider an issue before the U.S. Supreme
Court hears it; (2) the government needs flexibility in determining
when to appeal and (3) it is desirable to preserve policy choices for
successive administrations.'77 The Alaska Supreme Court found
that none of these factors were relevant to litigation involving the
state of Alaska. First, unlike federal courts, a superior court's
jurisdiction is statewide, and a litigant can appeal as of right.
Therefore, the court concluded that there was no need to allow an
issue to percolate before an appeal. 8 Second, unlike the federal
government, the state of Alaska litigates in only one jurisdiction
and is responsible for a smaller number of cases. Thus, there is less
need for flexibility in choosing only the strongest case to ap-
peal.'79 Finally, the court concluded that the third Mendoza
factor- preservation of public policy choices for successive adminis-
trators- "does not carry significant weight."'"
Notwithstanding its rejection of Mendoza, the supreme court
recognized a limited exception to the application of collateral
estoppel against the state on "unmixed questions of law." 1
Relying on section 29 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments,
the court explained that in cases of general interest, relitigation of
174. 895 P.2d 947 (Alaska 1995).
175. In United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court
adopted an exception to the application of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel
against the federal government.
176. United Cook Inlet, 895 P.2d at 957. The requirements for non-mutual
offensive collateral estoppel are "(1) [t]he issue to be precluded from relitigation
must be identical to that decided in the first action [and] (2) [t]he issue in the first
action must have been resolved by a final judgment on the merits." Id. at 950.
Alaska courts generally do not require mutuality between the parties; however,
mutuality may nevertheless be required in the interest of fairness. Id. at 951.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 951-52.
179. Id.




questions of law, unmixed with facts previously litigated, allows for
wiser formulations and further development of law and is therefore
allowable." It also noted that this exception is strengthened
when the issue to be precluded involves a government agency
responsible for administering laws applicable to many similarly
situated persons."s In this case, the court determined that the
exception applied because the issue of law in question was a
statement by a superior court that "all Alaskans are subsistence
users" of fish populations.' The supreme court determined that
the issue was of general interest and affected all Alaskans;
therefore, it permitted the state to relitigate it."
In Staso v. State Department of Transportation,.. the su-
preme court held that a refied suit, which is assigned a new docket
number, for which new filing fees are imposed, and for which new
process must issue, is a new "action" for the purposes of Alaska
Rule of Civil Procedure 42(c),"s even if the reified suit is identi-
cal to a case dismissed under Rule 16.1(g).' Plaintiff Michael
Staso had attempted peremptorily to disqualify a judge assigned to
the case he had refiled.Y In order to facilitate future litigants'
determinations of whether they have a right under Rule 42(c) to
disqualify a judge assigned to a refiled case, the court adopted the
bright-line rule stated above. In light of this new rule, Staso was
allowed peremptorily to disqualify the judge in the newly filed
case. 90 The court stressed that the rule should not apply to
collateral or later proceedings in the same case.'
In McGilvary v. Hansen,92 the supreme court vacated as
disproportionately severe a sanction striking the pleadings of and
imposing liability on a defendant in a personal injury suit where the
182. Id. at 952-53 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(7)
(1982)).
183. IL (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 cmt. i (1982)).
184. Id. at 949 (citing Morry v. State, No. 2BA-83-87 Civ. (Alaska Super., May
23, 1991).
185. Id. at 954.
186. 895 P.2d 988 (Alaska 1995).
187. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 42(c)(setting out procedures by which a litigant may
disqualify an assigned judge).
188. Staso, 895 P.2d at 990.
189. Id. at 989.
190. Id at 993.
191. Id. at 991.
192. 897 P.2d 605 (Alaska 1995).
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defendant inaccurately responded to a discovery request.'93
Plaintiffs Betty and Clarence Hansen filed suit against the opera-
tors of a tour bus in which Mr. Hansen was injured during an
accident. In a written interrogatory, the plaintiffs requested from
the defendant a list of all passengers on the bus. The defendant
responded that no such list existed, but in the process of deposing
certain employees of the defendant, the Hansens discovered that
the defendant in fact had such a list, which was then provided to
the Hansens.'94 In response to the Hansens' subsequent motion
for sanctions, the court found that the defendant's failure to
provide the names of passengers was willful, struck the defendant's
pleadings and imposed liability for the injury on the defendant.'95
The supreme court vacated the sanctions order, observing that
prior cases "narrowly define the permissible range within which a
trial court may impose litigation-ending sanctions."'96 Specifical-
ly, a court must find that the non-complying party willfully
committed the discovery violation in question, and a court must
also explore possible alternatives to dismissal prior to imposing
litigation-ending sanctions."9 The court held that the trial court
abused its discretion in striking the defendant's pleadings because
it failed to consider any lesser sanction or remedy, such as a
continuance of discovery and an award of costs resulting from the
violation. 8 In addition, the court noted that the discovery error
did not gravely prejudice the Hansens, given that the requested
information was eventually provided to them before the close of
discovery.' Therefore, the court concluded that in light of the
availability of other sanctions and remedies, the liability sanction
was excessively severe.2
In White Mountain Mining Partners v. Ptarmigan Company,
Inc.,"' the supreme court applied the three-part test developed
in Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. The Narrows2 in determin-
193. Id. at 607.
194. Id. at 605-06.
195. Id. at 606.
196. Id. at 607 (citing Highes v. Bobich, 875 P.2d 749, 752 (Alaska 1994)).





201. 906 P.2d 1357 (Alaska 1995).
202. 846 P.2d 118, 119-20 (Alaska 1993).
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ing that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering
litigation-ending sanctions. Before a court may conclusively
resolve an issue against a party who has not complied with
discovery orders, the Underwriters test provides that (1) the court
must find a willful violation of the discovery order (2) the record
must "indicate H a reasonable exploration of possible and meaning-
ful alternatives" and (3) there must be "a sufficient relationship
between the discovery materials and the case."'  The court
found that the record supported the superior court's finding that
the defendant's noncompliance was willful because he had
disobeyed two separate court orders to turn over certain tax
returns. In addition, the superior court had considered possible
and meaningful alternatives to the sanctions in that it imposed
monetary fines upon the defendant, after which he still failed to
turn over the requested documents. Finally, the discovery materials
were sufficiently related to the issue litigated because the tax
returns requested may have contained financial information central
to the plaintiff's allegation of fraud.'
In In Re Mendel,' the supreme court outlined the appropri-
ate procedures for in camera review of documents where there is
a claim of attorney work product privilege. The superior court had
held Mendel in contempt for refusing to produce her unredacted
billing records even though she had claimed the work product
privilege and had offered a redacted version.' The supreme
court determined that the use of in camera review of the docu-
ments was a less intrusive procedure than requiring production of
the records in open court.' 8
According to the supreme court, a superior court should, after
conducting its in camera review, "redact the attorney's mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories as well as any
privileged attorney-client communications which are unrelated to
203. White Mountain Mining, 906 P.2d at 1362.
204. Id
205. Id. at 1363. With respect to a second sanctions order, which related to a
separate set of documents, the court determined that the superior court had failed
to make a finding as to the sufficiency of the relationship between the documents
and the issues to be litigated. Therefore, it remanded the case for findings on that
question. Id at 1364.
206. 897 P.2d 68 (Alaska 1995).




the subject matter of the litigation." 9 The attorney should be
allowed to review the redacted materials and present arguments as
to why any of the unredacted material is protected by privilege.
210
Only after this procedure has been followed should the court
require the production of the relevant unprivileged information. n
In Beilgard v. State, the supreme court reaffirmed its
decision in Shaw v. State Department of Administration,213 in
which it held that public policy prohibited a convicted criminal
from imposing liability on others for the consequences of his
antisocial behavior.214 In doing so, the court dismissed a civil
claim against the state based on his conviction on criminal charges,
which he blamed on the negligence of the state.215 The plaintiff
was a Wyoming resident, engaged in the hunting and guiding
business, who sought to arrange a hunting trip to Alaska for some
of his clients.2"6 Pursuant to this plan, he wrote the Alaska
Department of Fish and Game to request information relating to
applicable state laws and license requirements.217  The plaintiff
corresponded with the Department several times in the ensuing
months,2 18 but ultimately became disgruntled with the pace at
which it was processing his requests. Therefore, he proceeded with
the hunting trip without having obtained all of the necessary
licenses.2 He was then arrested and convicted for guiding and
transporting hunters without a license.m
Subsequent to his conviction, Beilgard sued Alaska in tort,
alleging that the state's negligence in failing promptly to answer
his inquiries and process his requests had led to his arrest in front




212. 896 P.2d 230 (Alaska 1995).
213. 861 P.2d 566 (Alaska 1993).
214. Beilgard, 896 P.2d at 234.
215. Id. at 233-34.
216. Id at 231.
217. Id
218. Id.
219. Id at 232-33.
220. Idt
221. Id. at 233.
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appeal, the supreme court held that the action was contrary to
public policy and was, therefore, properly dismissed by the trial court.'
In Andrews v. Bradshaw,' the supreme court held that a
trial judge abused her discretion in precluding a defendant from
testifying at trial because his attorney had failed to comply with a
court order directing the attorney to make the defendant available
for deposition before the trial. 4  At a conference two weeks
before the trial was scheduled to begin, Judge Greene found that
it was unclear whose fault it was that defendant Andrews had not
yet been deposed,' but decided that because the plaintiff had
been prejudiced as a result, the defendant's attorney was obligated
to make Andrews available for a deposition before the trial.'
Judge Greene stated that Andrews could be deposed telephonically
if necessary but emphasized that he would not be allowed to testify
if his deposition was not taken. 7 Thereafter, Andrews's attor-
ney apparently forgot about the order, and the deposition was not
taken.' On the first day of the trial, plaintiff's counsel request-
ed that the presiding judge, Judge Beckwith, prohibit Andrews
from testifying for failure to comply with Judge Greene's order,
and the trial judge granted that request.'2 9 The jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed?"
The supreme court held that the trial judge had failed to
consider the reasonableness of prohibiting Andrews from testifying
in light of all of the circumstances and remanded the case for a new
trial." In its view, Judge Greene had envisioned the cooperation
of both parties in arranging the deposition of Andrews on such
short notice. 2 She certainly had not intended to shift the entire
burden for making such arrangements from the deposing party,
where it would ordinarily be, to the party being deposed. 3' The
court concluded that because plaintiff's counsel had also failed to
222. Id. at 234.
223. 895 P.2d 973 (Alaska 1995).
224. Id. at 974.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 975.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 976.
229. Id. at 975.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 976-77.
232. Id.
233. Id at 976.
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make any effort to arrange the deposition, he should not be
allowed to reap the windfall of prohibiting the defendant's
testimony.' 4
In Brandon v. Hedland, Fleischer, Friedman, & Cooke, 35 the
supreme court invalidated a wrongful death settlement involving a
minor because the superior court had failed to follow Alaska Rule
of Civil Procedure 90.2, which requires that before a court accepts
a settlement that compromises the claims of a minor, it must
determine that the settlement is "fair and reasonable."236  The
case involved a settlement in 1990 of a paternity suit, in which
Helen Carter and Eric Brandon withdrew their opposition to
Catrina Crume's claim that their deceased son was her father. In
return for the withdrawal, Carter and Brandon received a percent-
age of the proceeds of a wrongful death suit brought with respect
to the son's death2" Two years later, the superior court relied
on the 1990 agreement in distributing the settlement proceeds of
the wrongful death suit.3 8 However, the parties did not present
the superior court with any factual basis for finding that the
stipulation was "fair and reasonable," and the court made no such
finding.?"
B. Attorney's Fees
In Eyak Traditional Elders Council v. Sherstone, Inc.,2' the
Alaska Supreme Court held that the Eyak Traditional Elders
Council was a public interest litigant and was therefore immune
from an award of attorney's fees under Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 82.241 The Council had sought to prevent Sherstone,
Inc. from clearcut harvesting a fifty-acre tract of timber that it
believed was the location of an historic Eyak burial ground.
Because Sherstone had completed its logging operations on the site
during the litigation, thereby mooting the focus of the suit, the
Council moved for, and was granted, voluntary dismissal. The
234. Id. at 977.
235. 902 P.2d 1299 (Alaska 1995).
236. ALASKA R. Crv. P. 90.2(a)(2).
237. Brandon, 902 P.2d at 1303.
238. Id. at 1313.
239. Id. at 1312.
240. 904 P.2d 420 (Alaska 1995).




superior court then awarded Sherstone $10,000 in legal fees despite
the Council's argument that it was immune from such an award
because it had litigated issues of genuine public interest.242
The supreme court reversed, concluding that, although Alaska
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2)24 provided a basis upon which
a trial court could award attorney's fees against a party that has
successfully sought voluntary dismissal, such courts must still
consider whether the party is a public interest litigant for the
purposes of Rule 82.2' The court then determined that the
Council satisfied all four prongs of the public interest litigant test:
(1) the court found that the plaintiffs sought to "effectuate strong
public policies" (for example, seeking to compel the Alaska
Department of Natural Resources to abide by statutory mandates
pertaining to the use of land);245 (2) "numerous people" would
have "benefit[ed] from the lawsuit;"2' (3) despite DNR's statu-
tory authority to limit Sherstone's logging activities, "only a private
party [could] have been expected to bring the suit"'247 and (4) the
Council would not have had "sufficient economic motive to file suit
even if the action involved only narrow issues lacking general
importance."2'
In another case involving Rule 82, Abbott v. Kodiak Island
Borough Assembly,249 the supreme court held that a group of
homeowners who failed in their attempt to challenge a rezoning
242. Id. at 421-22.
243. Alaska Civil Rule 41(a)(2) provides that "an action shall not be dismissed
at the plaintiffs instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems proper."
244. Eyak, 904 P.2d at 423. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82 provides that
"it is an abuse of discretion to award attorney's fees against a losing party who has
in good faith raised a question of genuine public interest before the courts." Id.
at 422.
245. Id. at 424.
246. Id. at 425. The court noted that the Alaska Historic Preservation Act
evidenced the legislature's determination that "all Alaskans are harmed when the
historical and cultural traditions of one of Alaska's native peoples are relegated
to a museum wall."
247. Id. In Southeast Alaska Conservation Counci4 Inc. v. State, the court had
held that the existence of governmental authority to act was not determinative of
this prong of the public interest litigant test. Rather, where it is clear from the
facts of the case that the state entity will not exercise enforcement powers, only
a private party can be expected to bring the lawsuit.
248. Id. at 426.
249. 899 P.2d 922 (Alaska 1995).
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decision did not qualify as public interest litigants and thus that
attorney's fees could properly be awarded against them pursuant to
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82.50 The homeowners had
appealed the Kodiak Island Borough Assembly's decision to
approve a housing development in their neighborhood, arguing that
the rezoning would harm the environment, damage the character
of the neighborhood and decrease property values.21 The court
held that the litigants met three parts of the four-part test govern-
ing qualification as a public interest litigant.52 First, the owners'
case was "partially designed to effectuate strong public policies,"
because they were concerned with environmental protection5 3
Second, numerous other people would have benefited had the
owners succeeded with their claim.' Third, only a private party
could have been expected to bring the suit"55
However, the court held that the owners failed to meet the
fourth prong of the public interest litigant test because they would
have had sufficient economic incentive to file the suit had the
action involved only narrow issues without general importance.5
6
The court noted that the owners had emphasized that the rezoning
would amount to a taking without just compensation, would lower
property values and would force them to fund local improve-
ments5 7 The court therefore distinguished their case from cases
in which litigants were concerned solely with health and safety
issues.2
C. Arbitration
In Ahtna, Inc. v. Ebasco Constructors, Inc., 5 the Alaska
Supreme Court overruled prior cases2' to hold that an arbitrat-
250. Id. at 925.
251. Id. at 923.
252. Id (citing Municipality of Anchorage v. Citizens for Representative
Governance, 880 P.2d 1058, 1061-62 (Alaska 1994)).
253. Id at 924.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 925.
257. Id. at 924.
258. Id. at 925.
259. 894 P.2d 657 (Alaska 1995).




or's interpretation of a contract "is not open to judicial review,
except on questions of arbitrability. 261  In finding the parties'
dispute to be arbitrable, the court applied a pro-arbitration
presumption that "if the arbitrator's determination of arbitrability
is 'a reasonably possible one that can seriously be made in the
context in which the contract was made,' then the court should
affirm that finding."262 The court rejected Ebasco's argument that
the dispute was not arbitrable because Ebasco's breach and Ahtna's
claim had arisen after termination of the parties' joint venture
agreement, which contained the parties' agreement to arbitrate.
Instead, the court found that because Ebasco's obligation to Ahtna
arose during the term of the joint venture agreement, it did not
matter that the breach of that obligation occurred after the joint
venture agreement expired. The court concluded that "disputes
over obligations arguably arising from an expired contract are
arbitrable."'
In Feichtinger v. Conant,26 the supreme court granted
arbitrators absolute immunity from liability for damages arising out
of their quasi-judicial actions.' An issue of first impression, the
court held that "[a]rbitral immunity is the rule in virtually all
jurisdictions, and we now adopt it."2" Applying this doctrine, the
court ruled that an arbitrator is immune from claims alleging that
the arbitrator deprived a party of due process rights.267
The court also faced the arbitrator's appeal for seventy-five
percent of his attorney's fees in defending the liability suit.
26
The court held that because this was the first case dealing with
arbitral immunity, the superior court's award of only thirty percent
of the arbitrator's attorney's fees was within its discretion.269 In
the future, however, similar suits could be considered frivolous and,
as a result, would justify an award of actual fees.27
261. Id. at 661 (quoting Alaska State Hous. Auth. v. Riley Pleas, Inc., 586 P.2d
1244, 1247 (Alaska 1978)).
262. I& at 662 (quoting University of Alaska v. Modem Constr., Inc., 522 P.2d
1132, 1137 (Alaska 1974)).
263. Id. at 664.
264. 893 P.2d 1266 (Alaska 1995).
265. Id. at 1267.
266. Id. (footnote omitted).
267. Id. at 1266-67.






In Abruska v. State Department of Corrections,27' the Alaska
Supreme Court held that the Alaska Department of Corrections
infringes a prisoner's right to due process of law if it does not allow
the prisoner to call certain witnesses to testify at a disciplinary
hearing about evidence that is not "repetitious or irrelevant."' 2
Plaintiff Abruska had been accused of indecent exposure by a
corrections officer. At his disciplinary hearing, Abruska intended
to call two other inmates to testify that the same officer had falsely
accused them of similar conduct on previous occasions. The
hearing officer denied Abruska's request to allow the inmates'
testimony because the two inmates were not party to the incident.
A disciplinary committee concluded that Abruska had committed
the infraction and sanctioned him with one week of restriction to
his living module. 3  The supreme court reversed, holding that
insofar as the excluded testimony tended to show that the officer
had a history of filing similar unfounded charges, the testimony was
relevant to impeach the corrections officer's account of the
incident.274 Therefore, the testimony did not constitute "repeti-
tious or irrelevant evidence," which Department regulations permit
a disciplinary committee to exclude.' The court also found that
the disciplinary committee failed to follow the procedural require-
ments of the Alaska Administrative Code,276 that requires the
committee to question an officer who writes a disciplinary report
where an inmate requests that the officer appear at the hearing.2
The court concluded that the committee's failure to question the
corrections officer, together with its exclusion of the testimony of
the other inmates, deprived Abruska of his due process rights
under the Alaska Constitution. It remanded the case to the
committee for a new disciplinary hearing.
271. 902 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1995).
272. Id. at 322.
273. Id. at 321.
274. Id. at 322.
275. Id. (citing ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 22 § 05.430(c) (1991)).
276. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 22 § 05.420(b)(5)(A) (1991).




In Gyles v. State,279 the court of appeals applied the U.S.
Supreme Court's rule in Minnesota v. Murphy,' which holds that
a parolee "cannot validly invoke the constitutional privilege
[against self-incrimination].., when there is 'no real or substantial
hazard of incrimination."'' As part of his parole, defendant
Gyles was required to participate in sexual offender treatment, but
he could not enter a program because he refused to take a
polygraph test required for admittance. As a result of this refusal,
the Alaska Parole Board determined that he had broken his parole.
Gyles appealed, claiming that his refusal to submit to a polygraph
test was an exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination.
Applying Murphy, the court of appeals held that Gyles could
not invoke the Fifth Amendment to avoid discussing the crimes for
which he had already been convicted, since he had "no remaining
right of direct appeal" for those convictions. Therefore, any
admission he made could not harm him.' However, this same
conclusion did not hold for crimes for which he had not yet been
convicted. Because the record contained evidence that Gyles might
have refused the polygraph test to avoid discussing crimes for
which he had not yet been convicted, the court held that the
superior court had erred in dismissing Gyles's pleadings and
remanded the case for further consideration.'
In State v. Zerkel,' the court of appeals rejected the argu-
ment that an administrative driver's license revocation and
subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct does not
violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.'
In the case, each defendant had been arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol and had his driver's license revoked in an
administrative proceeding conducted by the Department of Public
Safety. Each defendant had also been subjected to criminal
prosecution by either the state of Alaska or the municipality of
Anchorage.0 6 The defendants claimed that the revocation of
279. 901 P.2d 1143 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
280. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
281. Gyles, 901 P.2d at 1148 (quoting State v. Gonzalez, 853 P.2d 526, 530
(Alaska 1993)).
282. Id. at 1149.
283. Id. at 1149-50.
284. 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
285. Id. at 757.
286. Id. at 745.
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their licenses constituted punishment and therefore that the
subsequent criminal prosecutions against them violated the Double
Jeopardy Clauses of the U.S. and Alaska Constitutions.'
The defendants relied primarily on United States v. Halperi
in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that "a civil sanction that
cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather
can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent
purposes, is punishment [for purposes of double jeopardy analy-
sis]." The defendants argued that, under Halper, any sanction
that serves a purpose other than compensating the government for
its monetary loss must be considered punitive, and not remedi-
al.29 However, the Alaska Court of Appeals noted that the
standard used in Halper was meant to apply only to cases in which
a defendant had been subjected to a monetary penalty, imposed
"ostensibly to compensate the government for its loss."29' Be-
cause no monetary sanction was involved in this case, that standard
was inapplicable.' g
The court then determined that license revocation statutes
existed primarily to protect the public from unsafe operators, not
to punish the operator for his wrongful actions,2' and thus were
basically remedial in nature, citing considerable authority in
agreement with this view. 94
In Shepherd v. State Department of Fish and Game,295 the
supreme court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of
Alaska Statutes section 16.05.255(d),296 which requires the Alaska
Board of Game to "provide that ... the taking of moose, deer, elk,
and caribou by residents for personal or family consumption has
preference over taking by nonresidents."2" Plaintiff Shepherd
claimed that the statute violated the Privileges and Immunities,
Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution,
287. Id. at 746; U.S. CONST. AMEND. V; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 9.
288. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
289. Zerkel, 900 P.2d at 747 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448).
290. Id. at 748.
291. Id
292. Id. at 751.
293. Id at 755.
294. Id. at 753-55.
295. 897 P.2d 33 (Alaska 1995).
296. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255(d) (1995).
297. Shepherd, 897 P.2d at 35 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255(d) (1995)).
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as well as the Equal Protection and Equal Application Clauses of
the Alaska Constitution.298
The supreme court rejected all of Shepherd's arguments.
Addressing Shepherd's federal constitutional claims, the court
dismissed his Privileges and Immunities claim because (1) Shep-
herd, as an in-state resident, lacked the standing to bring the claim
and (2) because the U.S. Supreme Court had explicitly held that
the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not protect the activity of
recreational hunting.299 It rejected Shepherd's Commerce Clause
claim because the "burdens imposed on interstate commerce" were
not "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."3"
The "purpose of conserving scarce wildlife resources for Alaska
residents" is clearly both an important and a legitimate state
interest, which outweighed the "de minimis" burden that the statute
placed upon interstate commerce."'
The court then rejected Shepherd's claim that section 16.05.-
255(d) violates the Equal Protection Clause, stating simply that
"the fact that the moose populations ... at issue are insufficient to
tolerate unlimited recreational hunting by both resident and
nonresident recreational hunters, taken together with the state's
interest as trustee of its wildlife for the benefit of state residents,
justifies the restriction. ' 3°2
Turning to Shepherd's state constitutional claims, the court
held that the regulations violated neither the Equal Rights and
Opportunities Clause nor the Uniform Application Clause of the
Alaska Constitution because both clauses apply only to those who
are "similarly situated.""3 3  The court found that residents and
nonresidents are not similarly situated in their use of Alaska game
and fish. 4
State v. Kenaitze Indian Tribe305 involved a constitutional
challenge to two parts of the Alaska subsistence hunting and fishing
statute, Alaska Statutes section 16.05.258.306 The supreme court
298. Id. at 36.
299. Id. at 41.
300. Id. at 42 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970)).
301. Id. at 43.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 43-44.
304. Id. at 44.
305. 894 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1995).
306. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258 (1992).
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held that the portion of the statute basing eligibility for a "Tier"
subsistence permit on proximity of the subsistence user's
domicile to the fish or game violated the "equal access clauses' '""n
of the Alaska Constitution but that the provision allowing the
establishment of "nonsubsistence areas ' 309 did not.3°
The court determined that section 16.05.258(b) (4) (B) (ii), which
requires the Boards of Fisheries and Game to consider the
proximity of the user's domicile to the subsistence stock in question
when issuing a Tier II permit, is unconstitutional under its decision
in McDowell v. State.3 ' In McDowell, the court held that it was
a violation of the "equal access clauses" to allow only residents of
rural areas to participate in subsistence fishing and hunting.312
The Kenaitze court concluded that McDowell stood for the
proposition that "residence-based criteria are not permissible" in
determining who may and may not have access to fish and
game.313 Section 16.05.258(b)(4)(B)(ii) was impermissible because
it "bars Alaska residents from participating in certain subsistence
activities based on where they live. 314
On the other hand, the court found that section 16.05.258(c),
designating nonsubsistence areas, was not unconstitutional, since it
did not prevent residents from engaging in subsistence activities
based on where they lived.3'" "Though subsistence permits may
not be issued [in nonsubsistence areas], subsistence activities can
still take place. What is eliminated... is the statutory subsistence
priority."31 6
307. A Tier II permit grants a subsistence user a preferred status in harvesting
fish or game when the fish or game population is insufficient to satisfy all
subsistence uses. Kenaitze, 894 P.2d at 633.
308. "Sections 3, 15, and 17 of Article VIII of the Alaska constitution are
collectively known as the equal access clauses." Stephen M. White, EqualAccess
to Alaska's Fish and Wildlife, 11 ALASKA L. REv. 277, 277 (1994).
309. A "nonsubsistence area" is "an area or community where dependence
upon subsistence is not a principle characteristic of the economy, culture, and way
of life." ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258(c) (1992)). No subsistence priority exists in
these areas. Kenaitze, 894 P.2d at 634.
310. Kenaitze, 894 P.2d at 642; ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, §§ 3, 15, 17.
311. Kenaitze, 894 P.2d at 638-39; McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d I (Alaska 1989).
312. Kenaitze, 894 P.2d at 638.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 642.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 640.
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In Pan-Alaska Construction, Inc v. State Department of
Administration, Division of General Services," the supreme court
reaffirmed that the state satisfies the Equal Protection Clause
under the Alaska Constitution31 8 when the interest at stake is an
economic one and the state's grounds for differentiating between
groups bear a "fair and substantial" relation to a legitimate govern-
mental objective.3 Plaintiff Pan-Alaska sued the Division of
Administrative Service ("DOA") to recover bid preparation costs
spent in connection with a cancelled state construction project? 2°
The DOA had already reimbursed three other construction
companies that had spent money preparing bids for the same
project and who had filed for the money within a six-month period
as required by DOA regulations?2 Pan-Alaska's claim, which
had been filed four months after the time limitation had expired,
was denied."2 Pan-Alaska appealed this decision, claiming that
in granting bid preparation costs to the other three companies but
not to them, the DOA violated its right to equal protection under
the Alaska Constitution.
Because the reimbursement monies came from a fixed pool
of funds, the court found that the DOA had a legitimate govern-
mental interest in knowing in a timely manner how many compa-
nies were claiming a portion of these funds?24 As Pan-Alaska,
unlike the other construction companies, had missed the six-month
deadline, the DOA had "reasonable ground for different treat-
ment.
,32
In O'Callaghan v. Coghill,326 the supreme court, in addressing
the constitutionality of Alaska's "blanket primary" statute,327 held
that "a stipulation or consent judgment declaring a law unconstitu-
317. 892 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1995).
318. ALASKA CONST. art. I, §1.
319. Pan-Alaska Construction, 892 P.2d at 162.
320. Id. at 160.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 160-61.
323. Id. at 162.
324. Id
325. Id. at 163.
326. 888 P.2d 1302 (Alaska 1995).
327. ALASKA STAT. § 15.25.060 (1988). The statute provides for a blanket
primary in which all primary candidates are listed on a single ballot without regard
to party affiliation. O'Callaghan, 888 P.2d at 1302.
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tional is invalid"3M and the blanket primary statute is not clearly
unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut.329
In 1992, the Republican Party of Alaska challenged the
constitutionality of the blanket primary statute in federal court.33°
That case was settled after the Republican Party and the Lieuten-
ant Governor stipulated that the Lieutenant Governor would adopt
regulations permitting a ballot containing the names of Republican
candidates only, which would then be available only to Republican,
non-partisan and undeclared voters? 3  The supreme court
determined that the state could not use this stipulation to defend
the regulations from attack by O'Callaghan because the stipulation
implied that the blanket primary statute was unconstitutional. The
court determined that "[t]he question of the constitutionality of a
statute is a judicial question, and it is not within the power of the
parties to admit or stipulate as to their invalidity."332
The court also rejected the state's argument that it had the
power to abrogate the blanket primary statute through the
regulations because the statute was "clearly unconstitutional" under
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut333 Although the
court recognized that "the executive branch may abrogate a statute
which is clearly unconstitutional under a United States Supreme
Court decision,"3" 4 it disagreed that the statute was clearly unconsti-
tutional under Tashjian. Tashjian required the court to balance the
state's interest in passing the statute with the burden the statute
places on the plaintiff's rights. Alaska's statute was not clearly
unconstitutional under Tashjian because Connecticut advanced a
very different interest in its statute. Connecticut's interest was
largely administrative, whereas Alaska's interests in passing its
statute were "encouraging voter participation in primaries and
enhancing voter choice." '335
328. O'Callaghan, at 1303.
329. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
330. O'Callaghan, 888 P.2d at 1302.
331. Id. at 1303.
332. Id at 1304 (quoting State v. Schnitger, 95 P. 698, 701 (Wyo. 1908)).
333. Id.; Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
334. O'Callaghan, 888 P.2d at 1304.
335. Id. at 1305.
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VI. CRIMINAL LAW
A. General
In Baker v. State, 36 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that
a defendant could be convicted of robbery under a complicity
theory, even though the state had argued to the jury that the
defendant should be convicted as a principal only.337 According
to the state's evidence, defendant Baker ambushed and beat a pizza
delivery man. Then he and two cohorts ran away with the delivery
man's pizzas. 338 At trial, the jury was instructed that it could
convict Baker as an accomplice to the acts of his cohorts, even if it
found that he had not actually ambushed and beaten the delivery
man.
339
The court of appeals rejected Baker's argument that it was
error to allow the jury to consider Baker's guilt under a complicity
theory after the state had argued to the jury that it viewed Baker
solely as a principal. Reviewing a long line of precedent, the court
concluded that a defendant charged as a principal may be convicted
as an accessory, and vice-versa.3 ° The court further held that the
revised Alaska criminal code had not abrogated this rule. 4'
The court distinguished Baker's case from Michael v. State,34z
in which the Alaska Supreme Court reversed a conviction for
assaulting a child. There the defendant was convicted on the
theory that, although he did not actually attack the child nor aid or
abet his spouse's abuse of the child, he had failed to perform his
parental duty to prevent his spouse's abuse. The supreme court
determined the conviction to be invalid because it was not clear
that the grand jury had considered such a theory.3 43 The court of
appeals in Baker distinguished Michael on the ground that, unlike
the defendant in Michael, Baker was put on notice that he could be
336. 905 P.2d 479 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
337. Id. at 489.
338. Id. at 480-81.
339. Id. at 481-82.
340. Id. at 486.
341. Id. at 487.
342. 805 P.2d 371 (Alaska 1991).
343. Id. at 374.
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convicted under an accomplice theory, given Alaska's non-distinc-
tion between principals and accessories.
3 4
In Ha v. State,345 the court of appeals read Alaska Statutes
section 11.81.330(a), 346 which allows self-defense to be a justifica-
tion for the use of "force" but does not expressly require that the
threat of physical harm be "imminent," in conjunction with Alaska
Statutes section 11.81.900(b)(23),347 which defines "force" to
include the threat of "imminent bodily impact,"3 to hold that "a
defendant claiming self-defense as a justification for the use of
force must prove that he or she acted to avoid what he or she
reasonably perceived to be a threat of imminent harm. 3 49 The
court determined that although defendant Ha might have reason-
ably feared future harm from the victim in the case-because the
victim had severely beaten and threatened to kill Ha, and had a
history of violence and of carrying out his threats35 --Ha's fear of
future harm was insufficient to support a claim of self-defense."'
Because the beating and threats had occurred twelve hours before
Ha killed Buu, and Ha stalked Buu for over an hour before
shooting him from behind, there was no evidence showing that Ha
was in "imminent" danger.52
The court also held that a defendant's perception of immi-
nence must be evaluated from the point of view of a reasonable
person in the defendant's situation who is "clear and rational" and
not mentally ill.3"3 Therefore, Ha's extreme fear and possible
brain injury from Buu's beating could not be used to establish a
reasonable perception of imminent harm.3"
In Booth v. State,355 the court of appeals addressed two
issues: (1) whether the state of Alaska has jurisdiction to prosecute
crimes committed on the Annette Island Reserve35 6 and (2)
344. Baker, 905 P.2d at 487-88.
345. 892 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
346. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.330(a) (1989).
347. Id. § 11.81.900(b)(23).
348. Ha, 892 P.2d at 191.
349. L at 194.
350. Id at 186-87.
351. Id. at 194.
352. Id at 188, 195-96.
353. Ld. at 195-96.
354. Id.
355. 903 P.2d 1079 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
356. Id. at 1083.
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whether the state is barred from prosecuting a defendant who has
already had a judgment entered against him by the Metlakatla
Indian Community's court."5 7 Defendant Lester Booth had been
fined $710 by the Metlakatla court for assault, battery and threat
or intimidation.35 Later, Booth pleaded no contest to a state
charge of fourth-degree assault.5 9
The court first noted that, under 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a),3" the
state of Alaska has jurisdiction over offenses committed in "all
Indian country within the state."361  The statute provides an
exception for the Metlakatla Community, however, giving the
Metlakatlans the power to exercise jurisdiction within the Annette
Island Reserve.36 The court held that this exception does not
give the Metlakatla Indians exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
committed on their land2' Instead, the language and legislative
history point to the conclusion that the state exercises a concurrent
jurisdiction with the Metlakatla Indian Community.3"
The court then held that the Federal Double Jeopardy Clause
does not prohibit both the state and the Metlakatla court from
prosecuting a defendant for the same crime, because the clause is
not violated when separate sovereigns prosecute a defendant for
the same criminal act.3" Nevertheless, the court noted that
Alaska Statutes section 12.20.010" bars the state from prosecut-
ing a defendant who has already been convicted in the Metlakatla
court.367 The court determined that "the question of whether
Booth was subjected to criminal prosecution (for double jeopardy
purposes) hinges, not on the sentence Booth eventually received,
but on Booth's potential risk of being sentenced to forced la-
357. L at 1085.
358. Id at 1082.
359. Id.
360. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1994).




365. Id. at 1085.
366. Alaska Statutes section 12.20.010 provides that "when an act charged as a
crime is within the jurisdiction of... a territory, as well as [within the jurisdiction]
of this state, a conviction or acquittal in the former is a bar to the prosecution for
it in this state." ALASKA STAT. § 12.20.010 (1995).
367. Booth, 903 P.2d at 1089.
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bor. , '  Although the Metlakatla court only fined Booth, his
crime was punishable under Metlakatla law by forced labor.369
The court found forced labor to be a criminal penalty. Because
Booth had already been subjected to a criminal prosecution, he was
immune from further criminal prosecution.370
In Dawson v. State,3 ' the court of appeals interpreted
Alaska's "crack-house statute"3" and held that the statutory
requirement of "keeping or maintaining" a dwelling for the
distribution of illegal drugs did not require the dwelling to be used
solely or primarily for such distribution,373 but did require that the
offense be of a continuous nature.374 Dawson had been convicted
of five counts of maintaining a dwelling for "keeping or distribut-
ing" cocaine after selling the drug to an undercover officer on five
occasions at his apartment.375 On appeal, Dawson asserted that
the crack-house statute applied only to dwellings used exclusively
for keeping or distributing controlled substances and that he could
not be convicted for five separate counts of the crime because the
crack-house statute applied to continuing offenses.376
Relying on federal cases interpreting a similar federal stat-
ute,377 the court of appeals rejected the defendant's first conten-
tion,37 holding that the statute applied as long as keeping or
distributing controlled substances was a "substantial purpose" of
the dwelling.3 79 However, the court reversed Dawson's convic-
tions and remanded the case because it agreed with Dawson that
the offense must be of a continuing nature and could not be an
isolated incident." In so holding, the court again relied on
federal decisions, as well as the "plain meaning" of the terms
"keep" and "maintain."38' Nevertheless, the court stressed that
368. Id. at 1088.
369. Id.
370. Id at 1088-89.
371. 894 P.2d 672 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
372. ALAsKA STAT. § 11.71.040(a)(5) (1982).
373. Dawson, 894 P.2d at 675.
374. Id. at 676.
375. Id. at 674.
376. Id.
377. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1).
378. Dawson, 894 P.2d at 675.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 676.
381. Id. at 675-76.
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this reading of the statute did not preclude the state from proving
a crime of a continuing nature based on evidence found on a single
occasion.3s
In another case involving Alaska's "crack-house" statute,
Wahrer v. State,31 the court of appeals held that in order for a
defendant to be convicted for "knowingly keeping or maintaining
any... building.., which is used for keeping or distributing
controlled substances, '' 31 the state need only prove that the
defendant "had the authority to control the premises if she chose
to exercise it. 35 The requisite knowledge of the activity may be
proved by "evidence that the defendant allowed the illegal drug
activity to proceed by 'tacit consent or by not hindering [or by]
taking no steps to prevent [it].' 386 Therefore, the court sustained
Wahrer's conviction, even though the jury instruction required
nothing more for a guilty verdict than proof that the defendant had
signed the lease on the apartment in which the drug sales were
taking place.3 7
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Sanders,3 the court of
appeals held that Alaska Statutes section 12.45.120(5)(D) is not
limited to "crimes against a person" but rather applies to all crimes
resulting in any form of injury.3" Section 12.45.120(5)(D) pro-
vides that criminal charges against a defendant may be dismissed
if the victim of the act has a remedy by civil action, except where
the crime has been committed against a person who previously
lived in a spousal relationship with the defendant.39 Under this
382. Id. at 676.
383. 901 P.2d 442 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
384. ALAsKA STAT. § 11.71.040(a)(5) (1982).
385. 1& at 444.
386. Id (quoting Dawson v. State, 894 P.2d 672, 677 n.5 (Alaska Ct. App.
1995)).
387. Id. at 443.
388. 902 P.2d 347 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
389. Id. at 348.
390. The statute provides, in relevant part:
If a defendant is held to answer on a charge of misdemeanor for which
the person injured by the act constituting the crime has a remedy by a
civil action, the crime may be compromised except when it was
committed...
(5) against
(A) a spouse or a former spouse of the defendant; [or] ...
(D) a person who is not a spouse or a former spouse of the defendant
but who previously lived in a spousal relationship with the defendant.
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provision, defendant Sanders moved to dismiss his prosecution on
charges of destruction of property belonging to a woman with
whom he had formerly lived, claiming that he had civilly compro-
mised with the woman to have the charges dropped.391 The trial
court granted Sanders's motion, holding that the statutory excep-
tion does not refer to property crime but is limited to "crimes
against the person. ,31 The court of appeals reversed, ruling that
the provision was not subject to such a limitation. 3 The court
based its conclusion in part upon the legislative history of the
statute. It noted that the original house bill specifically provided
that crimes committed "by assault against" certain enumerated
domestic victims could not be civilly compromised. However, when
the bill was passed by the legislature the "by assault" restriction
had been omitted 94
In Crim v. Municipality of Anchorage, 3 5 the court of appeals
held that a driver arrested for driving while intoxicated ("DWI")
need not be apprised of the results of a mandatory breath test in
order to waive "knowingly and voluntarily" the right to an indepen-
dent blood test guaranteed by Alaska Statutes sec-
tion 28.35.033(e).396  Having been arrested for DWI, defendant
Crim submitted to a breath test.31 The arresting officer informed
Crim of his right to an independent blood test, but Crim did not
ask to have one performed. 98
The court of appeals declined to adopt a rule stating categori-
cally that a DWI arrestee must know the results of his breath test
in order to waive knowingly and voluntarily the right to an
independent test.399 The court stated that such a rule would be
"artificial and uncalled for" since the typical DWI arrestee would
appreciate the importance of the breath test result well before its
result is disclosed. Rather, the court held, the totality of the
ALASKA STATUTES § 12.45.120 (1990).
391. Sanders, 902 P.2d at 348.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 350.
394. Id. at 349.
395. 903 P.2d 586 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
396. Id. at 587.
397. Id
398. Id




circumstances should govern the determination of the voluntariness
of a waiver of the right to a blood test."° The court found that
given the totality of the circumstances of Crim's refusal, he had
understood clearly the purpose of the breath test and had volun-
tarily waived his right to an independent blood test.'
In Peratrovich v. State,' the court of appeals rejected a
constitutional challenge to Alaska Statutes section 11.81.900-
(b)(53)(B)(i),4° which criminalizes sexual abuse of a minor,
holding that the statute's exception for contact "that may reason-
ably be construed to be normal caretaker responsibilities for a
child" was not unconstitutionally vague.4°  Defendant Pera-
trovich, convicted of sexual abuse of his thirteen-year-old grand-
daughter, argued that the term "normal" failed to specify a
reasonably ascertainable standard of conduct.' In rejecting this
contention, the court observed that under the statute, jurors are not
asked to decide whether they personally feel that the defendant's
act was part of "normal caretaker responsibilities" but rather
whether the defendant's acts might be construed as such by a
reasonable person.' Furthermore, the court noted that measur-
ing a defendant's actions against what a reasonable person would
deem proper is a common and acceptable legal standard.40' In
any event, the court stated that the Alaska Constitution does not
require "meticulous specificity" in the wording of statutes and that
"[i]t is difficult to perceive how the legislature might have been
more precise" in drafting the statute in question.
In State v. Fremgen,410 the court of appeals held that a
defendant is deprived of his right to due process of law under the
Alaska Constitution if the defendant is convicted of sexually
abusing a minor under the age of thirteen without being allowed to
advance a claim of reasonable mistake of age as an affirmative
401. Id.
402. Id. at 588-89.
403. 903 P.2d 1071 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
404. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(53)(B)(i) (1995).
405. Peratrovich, 903 P.2d at 1074, 1078 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900-
(b)(53)(B)(i) (1995)).
406. Id. at 1074.
407. Id. at 1075.
408. Id.
409. Il- at 1075-76.
410. 889 P.2d 1083 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
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defense.41' Alaska Statutes section 11.41.445(b) states that the
affirmative defense of reasonable mistake of age is available unless
the victim was under thirteen years of age.41' Although the trial
court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to the
defendant, the court of appeals did not reach its decision on this
basis. 4 3  Instead, the court based its conclusion on State v.
Guest, 14 an Alaska Supreme Court decision that held "it would
be a deprivation of liberty without due process of law to convict a
person of a serious crime without the requirement of criminal
intent."4 ' The court of appeals also emphasized that "[t]he
Supreme Court of Alaska has consistently refused to allow a
defendant to be convicted of a serious criminal offense based upon
strict liability. 416
In Fox v. State,41 1 the court of appeals determined that a
defendant's conviction does not violate section 1385 of the Posse
Comitatus Act ("Act"), a federal statute that prohibits the use of
the Army or Air Force to execute the laws, if the defendant's
misconduct is uncovered in the course of a joint military-civilian
investigation aimed at furthering a military or foreign affairs
function.4"' The court affirmed the conviction of defendant Fox
and his brother, who were apprehended pursuant to a drug
investigation conducted jointly by the Army Criminal Investigation
Division ("CID") and the Anchorage Police Department.41 1 The
court concluded that regulations promulgated under the Act, which
contain an exception permitting joint military-civilian drug
enforcement efforts when those efforts are undertaken "for the
primary purpose of furthering a military or foreign affairs func-
411. ML at 1084.
412. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.445(b) (1989).
413. Fremgen, 889 P.2d at 1084.
414. 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978).
415. Id at 838.
416. Fremgen, 889 P.2d at 1085.
417. 908 P.2d 1053 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
418. Id. at 1055. Section 1385 of the Posse Comitatus Act provides:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized
by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the
Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the
laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988).
419. Fox, 908 P.2d at 1056.
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tion,"4I were not violated because the record supported a reason-
able inference that CID was motivated by a legitimate military
purpose.421 The court pointed out that CID knew that drugs were
being supplied to soldiers at Fort Richardson because a soldier,
who acted as an informant in the investigation, had tested positive
for drugs during a urinalysis. CID initiated its joint investigation
with the police department in an effort to apprehend any such
suppliers.4z
The court also determined that CID was authorized to extend
its investigation beyond the apartment, which the informant had
identified as the location at which he had purchased drugs. The
court arrived at this conclusion because CID had "reasonable
grounds to believe" that Fox, from whom undercover agents
purchased drugs in a separate apartment, was associated with the
original targets of the investigation.'
In R.I. v. State,424 the court of appeals held that superior
courts lack the authority to convert a restitution order against a
defendant into a civil judgment.4' Having been adjudicated a
juvenile delinquent, R.I. was ordered to make a restitution
payment, which a superior court converted into a civil judgment
upon revoking his probation4 6 The court of appeals reversed
this aspect of the superior court's judgment, holding that no
provision of the Alaska Statutes authorizes a court to issue a civil
judgment in favor of a crime victim for the amount of damage
inflicted by an adult or juvenile defendant.427 The court noted
that in the realm of criminal law, the supreme court had repeatedly
held that legislation, not inherent judicial power, is the source of a
court's sentencing authority.4' In juvenile cases, the court stated,
the supreme court has followed the same rule.429
420. Id. at 1057 (quoting 32 C.F.R. § 213.10(a)(2)(i)), removed by 58 Fed. Reg.
25776 (April 23, 1993)). Although these regulations were removed from the Code
of Federal Regulations, they remain in effect as Department of Defense Directive
5525.5. 58 Fed. Reg. 25776 (April 23, 1993).
421. Id. at 1058.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. 894 P.2d 683 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
425. Id. at 684.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 685.
428. Md
429. Id. at 685-86.
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In State v. Albert,4' the supreme court held that Alaska's
recoupment system for recovering the costs of state-appointed
counsel for criminal defendants does not violate a defendant's
federal right to counsel, or federal or state equal protection rights.
Alaska Statutes section 18.85.120(c)43' allows a court, after a
conviction, to enter a civil judgment for representation and court
costs against a defendant who was represented by state-appointed
counsel.432 If the defendant can show financial hardship, the
court can order the payment to be made in installments, or order
reduction, remission or deferral of payment. Alaska Rule of
Criminal Procedure 39 sets forth the procedures to be used to
implement the recoupment system.4 33
The supreme court held that the statutory recoupment
provisions do not violate the right to counsel as expressed in either
the Federal Constitution or the Alaska Constitution because the
statute protects recoupment debtors just as other civil debtors; it
adjusts a recoupment debtor's obligation in light of financial
hardship, and it allows a recoupment debtor to challenge the entry
of recoupment judgment before judgment is entered.4" Finally,
the court rejected the claim that Rule 39 violates equal protection,
concluding that the recoupment procedures are rationally related
to the legitimate goal of fair and efficient collection of fees.435
In Totemoff v. State,436 the supreme court addressed the
legitimacy of subsistence hunter Mike Totemoff's conviction for
violating Alaska Administrative Code title 5, section 92.080(7), 437
which prohibits hunting with the aid of artificial light.43 Al-
though Totemoff shot a deer on federal land with the aid of a
spotlight while in a skiff in navigable waters, the court first held
that the state had jurisdiction over Totemoff because state hunting
regulations like section 92.080(7) could be applied to subsistence
hunters on federal land.439 The state would lack jurisdiction only
430. 899 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1995).
431. ALAsicA STAT. § 18.85.120(c) (1994).
432. Albert, 899 P.2d at 104.
433. ALASKA R. CamN. P. 39.
434. Albert, 899 P.2d at 112.
435. Id at 115-16.
436. 905 P.2d 954 (Alaska 1995).
437. ALASKA ADMiN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.080(7) (July 1995).
438. Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 957.
439. Id. at 961.
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if its enforcement was preempted by federal law.' ° However, the
court found that (1) Alaska had not voluntarily ceded exclusive
jurisdiction over hunting on federal lands or consented to exclusive
federal control over this area and (2) the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act ("ANILCA")"' does not preempt the
enforcement of state hunting laws against subsistence users on
federal land."2 The court reasoned that regulation of hunting is an
area traditionally controlled by the states, and ANILCA did not
evince a clear and manifest purpose to take over that area. 3
Moreover, ANILCA does not preempt section 92.080(7) because
there is no conflict between the state regulation and ANILCA. In
fact, the federal statute does not prevent the use of a spotlight as
a means of subsistence hunting.444
Alternatively, the court ruled that the state had jurisdiction
over Totemoff because it had exclusive jurisdiction over the
navigable waters where Totemoff was located when he fired his
rifle; those waters are not "public lands" within the ambit of
ANILCA.45  The court found that neither the federal govern-
ment's navigational servitude nor its reserved water rights gave the
federal government the right to regulate hunting and fishing in
Alaska's navigable waters.*4
After determining that jurisdiction was properly asserted, the
court reversed the superior court's determination that Totemoff was
prohibited from challenging the validity of the subsistence hunting
regulation in a criminal proceeding. 7 The court held that this
prohibition was based on a misinterpretation of State v. Eluska,4
which stands for the proposition that a person may not hunt for
subsistence purposes if there are no regulations authorizing the
person to do so, not that a hunter is barred from defending against
criminal prosecution on the ground that the challenged regulation
is procedurally invalid."9 However, the court rejected Totemoff's
440. Id at 958.
441. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (1988).
442. Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 960.
443. Id. at 959.
444. Id. at 961.
445. Id. at 968.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 969.
448. 724 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1986); ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.259 (1992).
449. Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 969-71.
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argument that State v. Morry450 required the Board of Game to
have held a special hearing on the regulation's impact on subsis-
tence hunting, holding that the Board needed only to have
complied with the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act451 for the
regulation to be valid.452 The court remanded the case to afford
Totemoff the opportunity to show that the Board failed to comply
and held that a finding of noncompliance would result in the
reversal of Totemoff's conviction.453
In Champion v. State,4' the court of appeals held that a
defendant's intent to sell stolen firearms to a pawn shop sufficiently
establishes an intent "to deprive" a person of property for the
purposes of convicting the defendant of theft under Alaska Statutes
section 11.46.100(1).' 55 Alaska Statutes section 11.46.990(8)(D)
defines the term "deprive" as "selling, giving, pledging, or other-
wise transferring any interest in the property of another. '456
Despite the defendant's obvious "pledging or otherwise transfer-
ring" of the property, he asserted that it had to be shown that he
concurrently intended permanently to deprive the owner of the
property as required in subsection (A), which defines the term
"appropriate" in section 11.46.100(1). 4!" The court concluded that
despite the wording in the Alaska Criminal Code Revision's
commentary to the contrary, an "intent to deprive" existed if
Alaska Statutes section 11.46.990(8)(D) alone was satisfied.458 A
plain reading of the statute showed that the terms "appropriate"
and "deprive" in section 11.46.100(1) are separated by the word
"or," which meant that theft could be premised on proof that a
person "deprive[d]" another person of property, without proving
that the deprivation was so permanent as to amount to an "appro-
priat[ion]."459
450. 836 P.2d 358 (Alaska 1992).
451. ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.62.180-.290 (1993).
452. Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 972.
453. Md at 973.
454. 908 P.2d 454 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
455. Id. at 458. Section 11.46.100(1) provides that a person commits the crime
of theft when, "with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate
property of another to oneself or a third person, the person obtains the property
of another." ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.100(1) (1989).
456. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.990(8) (1989).
457. Champion, 908 P.2d at 459.





In Noah v. State,( the Alaska Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction of a defendant because the trial court failed to obtain an
on-the-record waiver of his right to testify prior to submitting the
case to the jury. After the jury had begun its deliberations, the
prosecution informed the trial court that the court was required to
ask defendant Noah whether he wanted to testify. When Noah
indicated that he did want to testify, the court called the jury back
into the courtroom, informed them that the trial would continue
and told them that they should disregard the previously made
closing arguments. Noah's subsequent testimony was inconsistent
with the closing argument his counsel had made. After another set
of closing arguments, the jury returned a guilty verdict. 1
The court of appeals found that the trial court clearly erred by
failing to make an on-the-record inquiry regarding the defendant's
desire to testify.'6  The court concluded that this error preju-
diced Noah's right to fundamental fairness at trial because Noah's
testimony, which was inconsistent with his counsel's previous
summation, undermined both Noah's and his counsel's credibili-
ty.463
In Lewis v. State,' the court of appeals clarified the rule it
adopted in Garroutte v. State' that "[w]hen a defendant who has
chosen not to testify subsequently comes forward to offer testimony
exculpating a co-defendant, [this] evidence is not 'newly discov-
ered,' ,, 466 and a motion for a new trial under Alaska Rule of
Criminal Procedure 33 is properly denied.467 The court held that
the Garroutte rule applied not only to motions made under Rule
33, but also to motions made under Alaska Rule of Criminal
Procedure 35.1(a)(4), which allows post-conviction relief where
there exists "evidence of material facts, not previously presented
and heard, [that] requires vacation of the conviction ... in the
460. 887 P.2d 981 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
461. IL at 982-83.
462. Id. at 983 (citing LaVigne v. State, 812 P.2d 217 (Alaska 1991)).
463. Id. at 983-84.
464. 901 P.2d 448 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
465. 683 P.2d 262 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
466. Id. at 268 (quoting United States v. Diggs, 649 F.2d 731, 740 (9th Cir.
1981)).
467. Lewis, 901 P.2d at 449; ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 33.
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interest of justice."4 The court determined that Rule 35.1(a)(4)
"was not meant to enlarge the scope of previously existing post-
conviction rights." Thus, construing Rule 35.1(a)(4) to allow new
trials where Rule 33 does not would simply "elevate form over
substance," because new trial motions based on identical fact
patterns would be denied under Rule 33 and granted under Rule
35.1(a) (4).4 9
In O'Connor v. Municipality of Anchorage,47 the court of
appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction, ruling that a citizen
arrest does not constitute government action for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment where the police are informed of an arrest by
citizens and simply dispatch officers to the scene without offering
any encouragement or aid to the citizen-arresters.47' Defendant
O'Connor had been prevented from leaving a convenience store by
two private citizens who called the police after observing him pull
into the store's parking lot.47 The court found that the police did
not instigate the detention of O'Connor by the citizen arresters,
and the police dispatcher gave no instructions to the citizens.
Instead, the dispatcher merely notified the citizens that the police
were coming.473 The court also rejected O'Connor's argument
that the citizen arrest was state action because the police knew of
and acquiesced in it.474 Because the police had reason to believe
that a criminal offense had been committed in the private citizens'
presence and, thus, that the citizens had authority to detain
O'Connor, the police had no obligation to direct the citizens to
release him 475
In Rhames v. State,476 the court of appeals determined that
a defendant's right to be brought to trial within 120 days, as
required by Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 45,477 is not
468. Lewis, 901 P.2d at 449 (quoting ALAsKA R. CRIM. P. 35.1(a)(4)).
469. Id at 449-50.
470. 907 P.2d 1377 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
471. Id. at 1379-80.
472. Id. at 1378.
473. Id at 1380.
474. Id. at 1379.
475. Id. at 1380.
476. 907 P.2d 21 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
477. ALAsKA R. CRIM. P. 45.
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violated if continuances requested by defense counsel cause the
trial to occur after the 120-day limit.47
In another case involving the 120-day requirement of Rule
45(c), Drake v. State,479 the court of appeals ruled that Rule
45(c)41 was tolled by the filing of a discovery motion that re-
quired court action.4" Defendant Drake filed a motion to
compel discovery one month following his arrest on October 28,
1992, but withdrew the motion five days later. On February 25,
1993, the prosecution and defense agreed to a trial date of March
1. The following day, however, Drake moved to dismiss the
charges, arguing that the Rule 45 period had expired the day
before. The trial court denied his motion.'
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that under Alaska Rule
of Criminal Procedure 45(d)(1),' the time needed to resolve a
motion to compel discovery qualifies as a period of time that must
be excluded when computing the 120-day period! 4 The court
distinguished Drake's case from Miller v. State,4 85 which held that
a defense request for discovery did not toll Rule 45. In Miller, the
court noted, the defense's "request" for discovery did not ask for
the court affirmatively to intervene in the discovery process. 6
In contrast, Drake had filed a "motion" asking the court to issue
an order compelling the state to disclose certain information and
478. Rhames, 907 P.2d at 25. The court also revisited two issues of statutory
law. First, the court reaffirmed that pursuant to Alaska Statutes section
11.81.330(a)(3), a self-defense claim is not available to the initial aggressor in a
confrontation. Second, the court noted that an inoperable firearm constitutes a
"firearm" under Alaska Statutes section 11.81.900(b)(22).
479. 899 P.2d 1385 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
480. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 45(c).
481. Drake, 899 P.2d at 1388.
482. Id. at 1385-87.
483. Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(d)(1) provides in relevant part:
(d) Excluded periods. The following periods shall be excluded in
computing the time for trial:
(1) The period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the
defendant, including but not limited to motions to dismiss or suppress,
examinations and hearings on competency, the period during which the
defendant is incompetent to stand trial, interlocutory appeals, and trial
of other charges ....
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 45(d)(1).
484. Drake, 899 P.2d at 1388.
485. 706 P.2d 336 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
486. Drake, 899 P.2d at 1387.
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materials.4" Because the defense's motion tolled the commence-
ment of the 120-day period for five days, the period imposed by
Rule 45 had not yet run on February 20"
In Hill v. State,489 the court of appeals held that the doctrine
of Griffin v. California,49 which forbids unfavorable comment
relating to a defendant's exercise of the right to refrain from
testifying at trial, does not forbid per se a prosecutor's statement
that affirms the defendant's constitutional right to silence.49' The
court held that "a facially neutral reference to the constitutional
right to silence becomes impermissible... only when it appears, in
context, that the reference was manifestly intended as an adverse
comment on the defendant's failure to testify or that the jury would
naturally and necessarily understand it as such."4" Applying this
rule, the court of appeals did not find grounds for a mistrial when
the prosecutor stated, "Obviously the defendant does not have to
testify in this case. That is his constitutional right."4"
In Steffensen v. State,494 the court of appeals held that failure
to notify a defendant of the execution of a Glass warrant495
prejudices a defendant when the delayed notification "impairs the
defendant's ability to challenge [his] intercepted conversation." '496
In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished two types of
prejudice to a suspect. The first type, illustrated by United States
v. Donovan,"' results when late notification of electronic moni-
toring "hampers the defendant's ability to file pre-trial suppression
motions or gain pre-trial knowledge of the monitored conversa-
tions."'4 98 When this type of prejudice occurs, the court deter-
mined that evidence from the defendant's intercepted conversations
487. Id. at 1388.
488. Id.
489. 902 P.2d 343 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
490. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
491. 902 P.2d at 346.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. 900 P.2d 735 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
495. Pursuant to State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978), Glass warrants
permit authorities to record electronically a suspect's conversations without
informing the suspect for several days. In Steffensen, the superior court authorized
the state to wait 90 days before informing Steffensen. Steffensen, 900 P.2d at 737.
496. Steffensen, 900 P.2d at 743.
497. 429 U.S. 413 (1977).
498. Steffensen, 900 P.2d at 741.
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should be suppressed, without the defendant showing anything
more4 9
In contrast, the second type of prejudice occurs when, as a
result of the late notification, the defendant is delayed in finding
out that he or she is under investigation." ° This type of prejudice
"is cognizable under the rubric of pre-accusation delay."501 Thus,
to have evidence suppressed that relates to this type of prejudice,
"the defendant must establish both that he or she was actually
prejudiced by the delay and that the government had no valid
reason for its delay in filing the criminal charge against the
defendant." 502
The court concluded that the second type of harm existed
because Steffensen claimed that, as a result of the delayed
notification relating to the Glass warrants, he was not notified of
the criminal charges brought against him in time to find persons to
impeach the prosecution's witnesses. 53 Concluding that the trial
court had not adequately considered the reasons for the state's
delay in charging Steffensen, the supreme court reversed and
remanded the case.
In Haas v. State," the court of appeals determined when a
person who has agreed to drive to a police station for questioning
is "in custody" for the purposes of a Miranda warning." The
court applied the reasonable person test set forth in Hunter v.
State,s6 under which a person will be considered to be "in custo-
dy" if a reasonable person would not feel free to leave or break off
the questioning. At the beginning of the interview, the officer
informed the defendant that he was not under arrest and was free
to leave's 7 However, after the defendant implicated himself in
the crime and asked whether he was still free to go, the police
officer said he was not sure."08 The defendant subsequently
admitted to the crimes. The court found that the defendant had
been "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda after it became
499. Id.
500. Id. at 743.
501. Id.
502. Id. at 741 (emphasis in original).
503. 1& at 738.
504. 897 P.2d 1333 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
505. Id. at 1334.
506. 590 P.2d 888 (Alaska 1979).




unclear whether the defendant could leave, and all statements made
after that point should have been suppressed 9
In Johnson v. State, 1 the court of appeals held that an in
camera examination of a sexual assault victim should be conducted
only "when necessary" to determine the admissibility of evidence
reflecting on that victim's character."' Such an examination is
necessary "only upon a threshold showing of good cause-that is,
upon proof of a colorable ground to believe that character evidence
favorable to the defense actually does exist and will be disclosed by
the requested examination." ' 2
In Ryan v. State,"n the court of appeals decided whether a
"residual" hearsay exception applied to statements made to the
police by a deceased complaining witness, even though the statutes
did not fall within the listed exceptions to the hearsay rule. The
court's analysis focused on whether the statements had the "same
guarantees of trustworthiness that characterize the other types of
admissible hearsay."514 The court noted that "the primary factor
used by courts in evaluating the trustworthiness of hearsay is the
potential... to withhold or alter the truth." ' The court found
that the statements at issue did not have the requisite trustworthi-
ness, as the witness had motivation for making a false statement, in
addition to having made contradictory statements to the police. 16
In Kiehl v. State,517 the court of appeals elucidated the rules
in Reekie v. Anchorage,"' Anchorage v. Marrs"9 and Farrell v.
509. Id.
510. 889 P.2d 1076 (Alaska App. 1995).
511. Id. at 1079 (quoting ALASKA R. EvmD. 404(a) commentary at 454).
512. Id.
513. 899 P.2d 1371 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
514. Id. at 1379.
515. Id. at 1380.
516. Id. at 1379-80.
517. 901 P.2d 445 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
518. 803 P.2d 412 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990)(holding that right to confer with
counsel was violated where officers stood by defendant during telephone
conversation with attorney, and defendant was aware that the conversation was
being recorded).
519. 694 P.2d 1163 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985)(holding that defendant's right to
confer with counsel was not violated by the mere presence of officers during
telephone conversation with attorney, even though defendant felt that he was
unable to converse openly with his attorney).
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State, by holding that a defendant's right to hold a private
conversation with an attorney is not violated merely because the
arresting officer is in close physical proximity.521 To violate that
right, the police officer must "engage[ in additional intrusive
measures that indicate to the defendant that the officer is intent on
overhearing and reporting the defendant['s] conversations with [his]
attorney[]."" 2  In determining whether the officer "engaged in
additional intrusive measures," the court's "primary consideration"
was the confidentiality of attorney-client communications.' 2  In
this case, the court determined that the officer's physical proximity
was not intrusive because the officer came and went throughout the
conversation. That behavior, the court concluded, indicated the
officer had little interest in overhearing the conversation.
The court also recognized that recording a defendant's
conversation with his attorney could be sufficiently intrusive to
violate the defendant's right. However, the court determined that,
in this particular case, the officer's surreptitious recording of Kiehl's
conversation was not intrusive because Kiehl remained oblivious to
the recording. Hence, the recording had no "discernible impair-
ment of Kiehl's consultation with counsel."'524
In Gilbert v. State,'- the court of appeals applied the rules
stated in McCurry v. State" and Lewis v. State, 7 which govern
when a prosecutor can comment on a defendant's failure to call a
witness." The Alaska Supreme Court noted in McCurry that
"comment on a defendant's failure to call a witness is usually
allowed only when the absent witness is peculiarly within the
control of the defendant and when, under the defendant's version
of events, the witness could reasonably be expected to provide
testimony favorable to the defense.""5 9  In Lewis, the court of
520. 682 P.2d 1128 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984)(holding that right to confer with
counsel was violated where officer stood next to defendant and took notes on the
defendant's conversation with his attorney).




525. 891 P.2d 228 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
526. 538 P.2d 100 (Alaska 1975), overruled on other grounds by Howe v. State,
589 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1979).
527. 862 P.2d 181 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
528. Gilbert, 891 P.2d at 230.
529. Id. (citing MeCurry, 538 P.2d at 104).
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appeals noted that many courts have abandoned the requirement
that the witness be peculiarly within the defendant's control.53
Applying these two rules to the present case, the court held
that the prosecutor's comment on the defense's failure to call a
witness was improper because there was no evidence on the record
that the witness was available to the defendant.53' Furthermore,
there was no indication on the record that the witness would have
been anything other than a neutral witness without knowledge
helpful for clarification of any of the issues in dispute at trial. 32
Therefore, because the witness's testimony would not "naturally be
expected to be favorable" to the defendant, the prosecution could
satisfy neither the McCurry rule nor the Lewis rule, and the
prosecutor's mention of the defendant's failure to call the witness
was not legal.5 33
In Rogers-Dwight v. State,5" the court of appeals refined the
rule of Ozhuwan v. State535 that "to justify conduct that would
amount to [a Fourth Amendment] stop, an officer must be aware
of at least some specific circumstances" supporting a reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing or a reasonable belief that the occupants
of a vehicle need assistance.536 In this case, defendant Rogers-
Dwight pulled her car over to the side of the road when she
noticed a police car with its overhead lights turned on. Rogers-
Dwight had parked behind another car-a car which had been
speeding and which the officer had intended to stop. When the
officer approached Rogers-Dwight's car to inform her that she was
not the object of his stop, he noticed that she appeared intoxicated
and arrested her.537 The defendant claimed that her arrest
amounted to an illegal Fourth Amendment stop because the officer
had no reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.538 The court of
appeals sustained the defendant's conviction, holding that (1) it was
reasonable for the officer to make contact with the defendant to
advise her that she was free to go and (2) it was permissible for the
530. Id. (citing Lewis, 862 P.2d at 190).
531. Id. at 231.
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. 899 P.2d 1389 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
535. 786 P.2d 918 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
536. 899 P.2d at 1391 (quoting Ozhuwan, 786 P.2d at 922).
537. Id. at 1389-90.
538. Id. at 1390.
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officer to approach and, speak to the defendant to eliminate the
chance that the defendant might be harmed if the officer's
impending contact with the driver that had been speeding took a
bad turn.539
In Moore v. State, 4° the court of appeals applied Alaska
Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(d), which grants the right perempto-
rily to challenge a judge, and held that a single co-defendant could
exercise the peremptory challenge without the consent of the other
co-defendants. 4' When co-defendants, who as a group are
permitted one peremptory challenge of a judge, could not agree on
the use of the challenge, one defendant unilaterally challenged the
judge. 42 The remaining defendants appealed, arguing that the
challenging defendant should not have the power unilaterally to
exercise the one peremptory challenge. 43 The co-defendants
requested that the challenge be invalidated or alternatively that
additional peremptory challenges be granted.5 "
The court of appeals reasoned that if the use of a peremptory
challenge is necessary to ensure one defendant a fair trial, then
justice is best served by allowing the challenge, even if the other
co-defendants prefer the original judge.545 In addition, absent a
claim that the new judge would be unable to provide a fair trial for
the remaining defendants, it is unnecessary to provide additional
peremptory challenges to those defendants.Y
In Tan v. State,547 the court of appeals held that a litigant
may not be subject to Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure
25(d)(5)5" when her counsel was told by a court official that,
contrary to the language of the Rule, he could peremptorily
challenge a superior court judge after having participated in a
539. Id. at 1392.
540. 895 P.2d 507 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).





546. Id. at 512-13.
547. 900 P.2d 759 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
548. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 25(d)(5). Rule 25(d)(5) prohibits a litigant from
challenging a judge if the litigant, "knowing that the judge has been permanently
assigned to the case, participates before the judge in . . . a [change-of-plea]
hearing." Tan, 900 P.2d at 763.
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change-of-plea hearing before the judge.49 The court of appeals
found that the factual claim made by Tan's attorney concerning his
conversation with the court official had not been fully litigated."'
The court held that if the attorney's assertion was true, Tan might
not have waived her right to challenge Judge Hopwood by having
appeared before him for the change-of-plea hearing."5 Addition-
ally, the court held that Tan may be entitled to relief under Alaska
Rule of Criminal Procedure 53,52 which provides that "[the
Criminal Rules] may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in
any case where it shall be manifest to the court that a strict
adherence to them will work injustice." ' The court therefore
remanded the case to the superior court for a hearing on the
credibility and legal effect of the assertions in Tan's attorney's
affidavit.554
In Hugo v. State,55 1 the court of appeals refined the two-
prong Aguilar/Spinelli test556 for evaluating the adequacy of a
search warrant application that is based, in some part, on hearsay.
Under the Aguilar/Spinelli test, the government first "must establish
that the hearsay declarant obtained his or her knowledge in a
reliable manner (generally, through first-hand observation) and is
not speculating or repeating gossip.557  The government must
then establish that the hearsay declarant is a credible person. The
Hugo court concluded that the first prong of the test could be
satisfied "by inference if an informant furnishes the sort of detail
that generally could be obtained only through personal knowl-
edge., 558  The second prong may be met by showing that the
declarant is trustworthy or by showing that his or her information
has been independently corroborated.559
549. Tan, 900 P.2d at 763.
550. Id.
551. Id.
552. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 53.
553. Tan, 900 P.2d at 763 n.2.
554. Id. at 763.
555. 900 P.2d 1199 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
556. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410 (1969).
557. Hugo, 900 P.2d at 1201.
558. Id.
559. Id. at 1201-02.
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In another case involving the Aguilar/Spinelli test, Mix v.
State," the court of appeals held that an informant's tip "need
not necessarily satisfy the . . . test in order to contribute to a
finding that reasonable suspicion" of imminent public danger exists
so that an investigative stop may be justified 6' In response to
an anonymous report that the defendant was driving while
intoxicated ("DWI"), a police officer stopped a vehicle driven by
Mix, who was subsequently arrested for DWI. 6 Arguing that
there was no reasonable suspicion to support the stop, Mix
appealed from a denial of his motion to suppress all evidence
gathered pursuant to the stop.5 '
The court used the Aguilar/Spinelli test only as "a framework
for evaluating the trustworthiness of [the] hearsay report." 's 4
Because the officer had no indication the anonymous caler was
"speaking from personal knowledge" of the defendant's intoxica-
tion,"5 the court held that the stop was not supported by a
reasonable suspicion of imminent public danger 5 6
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In Tucker v. State, 67 the Alaska Court of Appeals applied
the two-prong standard of Risher v. State" for evaluating claims
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel to claims of both ineffective
trial counsel and ineffective appellate counsel. 69 Under Risher,
a defendant must (1) show that counsel failed to "perform at least
as well as a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in criminal
law, 570 such that counsel lacked "minimal competence, 571 and
(2) "create reasonable doubt as to whether counsel's lack of
560. 893 P.2d 1270 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
561. Id. at 1272 (citing Goodlaw v. State, 897 P.2d 589, 591 (Alaska Ct. App.
1993)).
562. Id. at 1271-72.
563. M. at 1272.
564. Md
565. Id.
566. Id. at 1273.
567. 892 P.2d 832 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
568. 523 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1974).
569. Tucker, 892 P.2d at 836.




competency contributed to the conviction.""57  Applying this
standard, the court found that Tucker's trial counsel was not
ineffective in failing to move for suppression of evidence relating
to clothing that was taken without a warrant because counsel
reasonably thought that the introduction of this clothing would not
be damaging to the case.573 In addition, Tucker did not create a
reasonable doubt as to whether suppression would have changed
the jury's decision. 74 The court also found the trial counsel not
to be ineffective in failing to seek exclusion of certain testimony
based upon "dream-refreshed" memory because counsel used a
sensible and potentially effective fact-based approach to challenge
the testimony.575 Finally, the court found that appellate counsel
was not ineffective in failing to seek appellate review of a meritless
claim because counsel had sound tactical reasons for doing so.
Moreover, as the claim was meritless, Tucker failed to show
prejudice. 76
In another case involving a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, State v. Steffensen,57 the court of appeals held that, when
a criminal defendant's post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance
is based upon her attorney's failure to challenge the government's
evidence, he must show that (1) such a proposed suppression
motion would have been granted if it had been filed during trial
and (2) there is at least a "reasonable possibility" that the outcome
of the trial court proceedings would have been different had the
evidence been suppressed. Defendant Steffensen had pled no
contest to a charge of cocaine possession. Following his plea, he
filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had
received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did
not seek suppression of the evidence found on his person by
attacking the legality of his arrest. The trial court determined that
there was a reasonable possibility that a suppression motion would





575. Id. at 834-36.
576. Id. at 836-37.
577. 902 P.2d 340 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
578. Id. at 342.
579. Id. at 341.
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The court of appeals remanded the case to the lower court for
two determinations. First, the lower court was directed to
determine whether Steffensen's attorney had a valid tactical reason
for not filing the suppression motion, which under Tucker v.
State ,80 would not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.58'
Second, the lower court was directed to determine whether the
motion would have been granted.5" Under Risher v. State,583
a defendant must prove (1) that the proposed suppression motion
would have been granted and (2) that there is at least a reasonable
possibility that the outcome of the trial court proceedings would
have been different had the evidence been suppressed.5 4 The
court concluded that suppression of the evidence would obviously
have affected the outcome of the case.5 5
In Broeckel v. State,586 the court of appeals held that, when
a client loses the right to appeal due to ineffective assistance of
counsel, the client need not show prejudice in order to have his or
her right to appeal restored." 7  After being convicted of first
degree sexual assault, Broeckel informed his counsel at trial that he
had hired a new attorney to represent him on appeal. Later,
Broeckel sent a letter to his trial counsel and indicated that he
expected him to file the notice of appeal. The trial counsel neither
filed the appeal nor informed Broeckel of his intention not to do
so, and the time for appeal expired.5"
The court found that the trial counsel's conduct had violated
Alaska Rules of Appellate Procedure 209(B)(4) and 517 as well as
DR 2-110(A)(2) of the Code of Professional Responsibility.5  It
described three reasons to support its decision that a defendant in
Broeckel's position did not need to show prejudice to have his right
to appeal reinstated. First, an attorney who fails to file a notice of
appeal "deprives the client of the right to an appeal, not just to the
580. 892 P.2d 832 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
581. Steffenson, 902 P.2d at 343.
582. Id. at 342.
583. 523 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1974).
584. Steffensen, 902 P.2d at 342.
585. Id. at 343.
586. 900 P.2d 1205 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
587. Id. at 1208.
588. Id. at 1206-07.
589. Id at 1208; ALASKA R. APPELLATE P. 209(B)(4), 517; ALASKA CODE OF
PROF. RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(A)(2).
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right to a successful appeal."59 Second, to decide if the client
was prejudiced by his or her attorney's failure to fie an appeal, the
court would have to rule on the substantive matters of the appeal.
Finally, requiring the trial court to rule on these substantive matters
would be giving it "the essentially circular task of reviewing the
propriety of its own legal decisions." ''
D. Sentencing
In Cornwall v. State,5" the Alaska Court of Appeals held
that a sentencing court was barred by constitutional provisions
prohibiting double jeopardy from correcting its misstatement
regarding the length of a defendant's sentence if there was no
"objectively ascertainable mistake" suggesting the court's original
intent to sentence the defendant to the modified term."9 The
court of appeals noted that the sentencing court did not clearly
demonstrate its original intent to sentence the defendant to the
modified term. The contemporaneous record revealed no "irrecon-
cilable inconsistencies or obvious anomalies" precluding the court
from sentencing the defendant to the original term 94 Therefore,
the court's original sentence could not be increased.59
In Mack v. State,596 the court of appeals held that Alaska
Statutes section 12.55.085(f)(1)9 97 which prohibits a sentencing
court from suspending the imposition of sentences for sexual
offenders, applies not only to those convicted of a completed sexual
offense but also to those convicted of attempting a sexual of-
fense 98 The court reasoned that, while the language did not
specifically include attempted sexual crimes, "it would defy both
common sense and logic to think that a legislature concerned over
the repetitive and escalating nature of sexual offenders' conduct
would think it fitting to bar a suspended imposition of sentence
only for a completed offense, and not for an attempt. '599
590. Broeckel, 900 P.2d at 1208.
591. Id.
592. 902 P.2d 336 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
593. Id. at 339-40 (quoting Shagloak v. State, 582 P.2d 1034 (Alaska 1978)).
594. Id. at 339.
595. L
596. 900 P.2d 1202 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
597. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.085(f)(1) (1994).
598. Mack, 900 P.2d at 1202.
599. Id. at 1204.
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In Miyasato v. State,' the court of appeals refined the rule
of Roman v. State6°' that conditions of probation "must be
reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the offender and the
protection of the public."' The court held that, to satisfy the
Roman "reasonably related" test, "a condition of probation need
not be directly related to the offense for which the defendant
stands convicted."' Applying the refined rule, the court found
that the trial court properly could require a defendant convicted of
burglary to undergo sex offender therapy as a condition of his
probation.' In finding that the sex offender therapy was
"reasonably related" to the rehabilitation of defendant Miyasato,
the court noted that he had been convicted of two sexual assault
felonies before he had been convicted of burglary. Moreover, he
had perpetrated all three offenses against female victims.' 5 In
light of this fact, the court agreed with the trial judge, who posited
that the source of Miyasato's criminal activity may have been his
"anger" toward women. Thus, sex offender therapy aimed at
addressing Miyasato's aggression toward women was "reasonably
related" to his rehabilitation and to "the protection of the pub-
lie."
606
In State v. Sykes,6' the court of appeals disapproved a trial
court's failure to impose sentences of incarceration upon two white
collar criminal defendants. Having defrauded the state of Alaska
of at least $335,000 pursuant to a false janitorial services contract-
ing scheme, the defendants pled no contest to theft in the second
degree, a class C felony. 8 The trial court imposed a sentence of
three years of imprisonment on both defendants but suspended
both sentences. The court also placed each defendant on five years
probation and required each to make $268,282 in restitution, to pay
a $25,000 fine and to perform 150 hours of community service.0 9
The state appealed, arguing that the sentence was too lenient.610
600. 892 P.2d 200 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
601. 570 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1977).
602. Id. at 1240.
603. Miyasato, 892 P.2d at 201-02.
604. Id. at 202.
605. Id. at 200.
606. Id. at 202.
607. 891 P.2d 232 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
608. Id. at 232-33.




The court of appeals held that the trial court was required to
consider that "the defendants committed a more serious crime than
the one for which they were convicted. 61' According to the
court, the defendants actually committed first degree theft, which
criminalizes thefts of $25,000 or more.612 The court reviewed
several other Alaska cases that had approved lengthy sentences and
disapproved lenient sanctions imposed for similar crimes.613
Although the cited cases involved class B felonies, while the
defendants in the instant cases had been convicted of class C
felonies, the court concluded that "the magnitude of the thefts and
the likely failure of full restitution militate against imposing a
sentence which does not require incarceration., 614  The court
emphasized that failure to impose some period of imprisonment
"would send the message that white-collar criminals who commit
major theft offenses are able to avoid incarceration.) 615
In Espinoza v. State,6 16 the court of appeals applied the rule
of Austin v. State,617 which states that "normally a first offender
should receive a more favorable sentence than the presumptive
sentence for a second offender," in vacating a prison sentence
imposed upon a defendant for a probation violation.618 Defen-
dant Espinoza had been sentenced to three years imprisonment
with two and one-half years suspended. Due to a subsequent
probation violation, Espinoza was required to serve in prison six
months of the suspended portion of his sentence. Espinoza later
violated his probation a second time, and at his disposition hearing
requested that the court require him to serve only a part of the
remaining portion of his suspended sentence. He reminded the
court that imposing all of the remaining suspended incarceration
would yield a total sentence of three years imprisonment, a year
longer than the two-year presumptive term specified for a two-time
class C felony offender. As he was a first-time class C felony
offender, Espinoza argued that to require him to serve in prison his
611. IdM at 234.
612. Id. at 233.
613. Id. at 234.
614. Id. at 235.
615. Id.
616. 901 P.2d 450 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
617. 627 P.2d 657 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981).
618. Espinoza, 901 P.2d at 452 (quoting Austin, 627 P.2d at 657-58).
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entire suspended sentence would violate the rule of Austin v.
State. x9 The court expressed uncertainty as to whether the Austin
rule applied in the context of sentencing for a probation violation,
but alternatively found that Espinoza's conduct presented sufficient
aggravating factors to make his case an "exceptional" one for
purposes of the Austin rule. The court thus ordered Espinoza to
serve the entire suspended portion of his sentence.' °
The court of appeals, citing Bland v. State,62 vacated the
sentence.6' Bland held that the Austin rule applies to probation
violation sentencing but noted that, under Wylie v. State,6' a first
offender is entitled to advance notice of the aggravating factors
upon which the sentencing court will rely before receiving an
"exceptional sentence" under the Austin rule.624 Because Espino-
za had not received prior notice of, nor opportunity to contest, the
aggravating factors upon which the lower court relied, the court of
appeals vacated his sentence and remanded the case with instruc-
tions to provide Espinoza with advance notice of any aggravating
factors alleged by the state or relied upon by the sentencing
court.625
In Journey v. State,6' the supreme court held that, according
to Alaska Statutes section 12.55.085(e),6" the court does not
expunge a defendant's criminal record when it suspends the
imposition of his sentence and "set[s] aside" the conviction upon
the successful completion of probation.6" The court clarified the
confusion surrounding the meaning of "set aside," which defendants
often confuse with expunction.629 Defendant Journey had been
led by the trial court to believe that, upon completion of probation,
he would be able to tell others that he had never been convicted in
this matter."0  However, when Journey applied for jobs, his
619. Id. at 451-52.
620. Id. at 452.
621. 846 P.2d 815 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
622. Espinoza, 901 P.2d at 454.
623. 797 P.2d 651 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
624. Bland, 846 P.2d at 817-18.
625. Espinoza, 901 P.2d at 453-54.
626. 895 P.2d 955 (Alaska 1995).
627. ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.085(e) (1990).
628. Journey, 895 P.2d at 961 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.085(e) (1990)).
629. Id. at 962.
630. Id. at 956.
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conviction appeared on his records." The court rejected Jour-
ney's assertion that his conviction should have been expunged
because the statute could have clearly allowed for expunction if
that had been the legislative intent. 2
In Mancini v. State, the court of appeals held that a convic-
tion in another state may qualify as a prior conviction for purposes
of Alaska's presumptive sentencing statute, even though the
conviction would not have qualified as a prior conviction under the
other state's presumptive sentencing law.6' Defendant Mancini
had been convicted of burglary in California, and as a youthful
adult offender, he was sentenced to commitment to a youth
detention facility.635 Mancini argued that Alaska should follow
California law, where his burglary would not be treated as a prior
conviction for sentence enhancement purposes.
636
The court of appeals noted that the issue was governed by
Alaska Statutes section 12.55.145(a)(2), 637 which provides that "a
conviction in this or another jurisdiction of an offense having
elements similar to those of a felony defined as such under Alaska
law at the time the offense was committed is considered a prior
felony conviction." 8 The court held that Mancini's commitment
to youth detention qualified as a "conviction in ... another
jurisdiction" because California clearly regards such a disposition
as a conviction, even if it does not treat it as such for presumptive
sentencing purposes.639 Mancini did not dispute that the burglary
involved "elements similar to those of a felony defined as such
under Alaska law."'
In Callan v. State,64 the court of appeals held that for pur-
poses of calculating a prisoner's good time credit and parole release
date, the prisoner's various consecutive sentences should be treated
as one composite sentence.' 4z The court applied this rule to
631. Id.
632. Id. at 958-59.
633. 904 P.2d 430 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
634. Id. at 431.
635. Id. at 432.
636. Id. at 431.
637. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145(a)(2) (1995).
638. Mancini, 904 P.2d at 432 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145(a)(2) (1995)).
639. Id.
640. Id.
641. 904 P.2d 856 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
642. Id. at 858.
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defendant Callan, who had been convicted of burglary while serving
one year of parole relating to a previous theft conviction.' 4 The
superior court revoked his parole, ordered him to serve the one-
year period in prison and sentenced him to three years in prison for
the burglary conviction.' In an application for post-conviction
relief, Callan argued that, because Alaska law permitted a prisoner
to accrue good time credit at the rate of one day for every two
days of good behavior in prison, he should be deemed to have
completed his one-year theft sentence at the end of eight months.
He contended that after eight months he would immediately begin
four months of mandatory parole for the theft sentence. Thus,
Callan argued, he would begin serving his three-year burglary
sentence while he simultaneously served the four months of
parole."4  However, the court agreed with the Alaska Depart-
ment of Corrections that Callan should be treated as having one
composite four-year sentence, in which instance he would be
released from prison four months later than if he were treated as
having two separate sentences.' The court noted that Alaska's
statutes had been modeled upon former federal statutes, and that
federal courts interpreting them had reached the same conclu-
sion.647
In Pusich v. State, 6the court of appeals held that a sentence
of twenty-five years imprisonment with seven years suspended for
manslaughter and first-degree assault in a vehicular homicide case
was not excessive, even though it was longer than any prior
sentence for vehicular homicide affirmed on appeal in Alaska. 9
The court concluded that the facts of the particular case supported
the sentence because Pusich was not a youthful offender, her
recklessness was egregious and she had a long history of driving
offenses including drunk driving and alcohol abuse. In addition,
she had a propensity to engage in reckless drunk driving despite
warnings to the contrary, and the results of her conduct were
extreme-killing three people and seriously injuring a fourth.50





648. 907 P2d 29 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
649. Id at 39.
650. ld at 39-40.
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The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the state had
proven that Pusich's conduct implicated aggravating factor (c)(10),
which covers conduct that is considered the worst within the
definition of manslaughter, because the single manslaughter count
accounted for all three deaths.65'
E. Evidence
In Jackson v. State,"2 the court of appeals held that expert
testimony is not required to prove the mental incapacity of a victim
in order to convict a defendant of second-degree sexual assault.5 3
Second degree sexual assault, according to Alaska Statutes section
11.41.420(a)(3)(A), includes sexual penetration "with a person who
the offender knows is mentally incapable."6' While Alaska
courts had not previously ruled on the issue of expert testimony,
the court decided that expert testimony was not required to show
a victim lacked the ability to understand the nature and conse-
quences of engaging in sexual activity because a jury could make
this determination from circumstantial evidence. 655 The testimony
of the victim and her mother sufficiently demonstrated that,
although the victim had a basic understanding of the mechanics of
sexual intercourse, she could not recognize the practical conse-
quences of her actions. 6 6
In Lau v. State,657 the court of appeals held that the incrimi-
nating results of a breath test administered to an arrestee charged
with driving while intoxicated ("DWI") must be suppressed because
a corrections officer dissuaded the driver from taking an indepen-
dent blood test. 8 After being arrested for DWI, defendant Lau
was informed of his right to take an independent blood test. While
in police custody, Lau was left alone with corrections officer James
Wood, with whom Lau happened to be friends. Wood informed
Lau that the blood tests yielded higher readings than the breath
tests, and that the police could use the results of such tests against
651. Id. at 33; ALASKA STAT. 12.55.155(c)(10) (1995).
652. 890 P.2d 587 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
653. Id. at 589.
654. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.420(a)(3)(A) (1989).
655. Jackson, 890 P.2d at 591-92.
656. Id. at 592.
657. 896 P.2d 825 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
658. Id. at 829.
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him. On the basis of this advice, Lau chose not to take the blood
test.659
Lau argued that, pursuant to Ward v. State,6 ° the result of
his breath test must be suppressed because the state interfered with
his right to an independent test.66' The court of appeals agreed,
holding that the corrections officer's conduct, even if it had been
motivated solely by friendship, must be attributed to the state.662
The court noted that "Wood was an on-duty, uniformed corrections
officer guarding Lau as part of his duties at the pre-trial facili-
ty.' '61 It found that the only reason Wood was in a position to
dissuade Lau from exercising his rights was because Wood was a
government officer having custody of Lau.6 Citing Ward, in
which the Alaska Supreme Court had concluded that deterrence of
police misconduct was a compelling rationale for excluding breath
tests where the state interferes with the right to an independent
test, the court of .appeals held that suppression of the breath test
was the proper remedy.6 '
In Downie v. Superior Court,66 the court of appeals held that
the attorney-client privilege did not protect a communication from
an attorney to her client when the subject of the communication
was a matter of public record.667 Susan Downie, an assistant
public defender, appealed from an order of the superior court
holding her in contempt for refusing to testify as to whether she
informed her client of the client's revised criminal trial date.6s
Noting that the case law of other states uniformly held that the
attorney-client privilege did not cover an attorney's act of convey-
ing public information to a client,669 the court of appeals refused
to deem the trial date a confidential matter. Downie also argued
that the rule of confidentiality enunciated in Alaska Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.6(a) expands the attorney-client privilege
659. Id. at 827.
660. 758 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1988) (holding that results of breath tests must be
suppressed if the state interferes with the driver's right to an independent test).




665. Id. at 828-29.
666. 888 P.2d 1306 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
667. Id. at 1310.
668. Id. at 1308.
669. Id at 1310.
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codified in the Alaska Rules of Evidence.67 Rejecting Downie's
argument, the court relied on the commentary to Rule 1.6(a) to
hold that an attorney's obligation to give testimony concerning a
client is completely governed by the rules of evidence.67 1 The
court concluded that Rule 1.6(a) does not expand the attorney-
client privilege because it requires an attorney to invoke the
attorney-client privilege only when it is applicable. 672
In M.R.S. v. State,673 the supreme court determined the
proper scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege under Alaska
Rule of Evidence 504(b) as it relates to court-ordered examina-
tions.674 The superior court admitted a court-ordered psychologi-
cal examination from a prior juvenile proceeding into evidence
during a hearing to determine whether the defendant should be
tried as a juvenile or adult.675 The court of appeals agreed that
the examination was properly admitted, on the ground that
communications made during court-ordered examinations are not
intended to be confidential.676
The supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that court-
ordered examinations are admissible only for the specific purpose
for which the examination is ordered.6' The court reasoned that
Rule 504(d)(6) provides an exception that deems communications
made during court-ordered examinations not to be confidential
insofar as they relate to the purpose for which the examination was
ordered. If the broad exception recognized by the court of appeals
were the rule, the existing exception in 504(d)(6) would be
superfluous.678
VII. ELECTION LAW
In Dansereau v. Ulmer,679 the supreme court addressed
challenges by ten voters to the November 8, 1994, gubernatorial
670. l at 1308-09. Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(a) directs an
attorney "not [to] reveal information relating to representation of a client unless
the client consents after consultation."
671. Downie, 888 P.2d at 1309.
672. l-
673. 897 P.2d 63 (Alaska 1995).
674. Id. at 67; ALASKA R. EviD. 504(b).
675. M.R.S., 897 P.2d at 64-65.
676. Id. at 65-66.
677. 1l at 67.
678. Id.
679. 903 P.2d S55 (Alaska 1995).
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election in which Tony Knowles was elected Governor of Alas-
ka.681 The voters asserted that certain monetary incentive
schemes used during the election to encourage individuals to vote
violated state and federal election laws. The court rejected the
general challenge to such schemes, ruling that they are permissible
when there is no evidence that would permit a reasonable inference
that the persons responsible for the assistance program had
intended to induce voters to vote for a particular candidate.68'
Specifically, the court found that Alaska Statutes section 15.56.030-
(a)(2),6" which prohibits a person from paying another person to
vote for a particular candidate or proposition, does not prohibit
compensation for voting per se.6s  The court then upheld the
summary judgment decision that a North Slope Borough voter
assistance program, which reimbursed rural voters for gasoline used
for transportation to the polls, did not violate election laws because
there was no evidence that the program organizers attempted to
sway voters' choices.' However, applying this same standard,
the court concluded that a postcard mailed to voters may have
violated state election law because the postcard offered entry in a
$1,000 cash prize drawing to those who submitted a ballot stub and
stated that the Alaska Federation of Natives overwhelmingly
endorsed Tony Knowles for governor.6 Therefore, the court
found that the trial court erred in finding that as a matter of law
the mailing did not violate section 15.56.030(a)(2).686
Also, the voters asserted that the state committed election
misconduct in its operation of the Prudhoe Bay voting station, at
which many voters had to wait up to two hours to vote.6s The
court declined to hold that an unreasonable wait at an absentee
voting station, in itselt can be considered election misconduct in
violation of Alaska Statutes section 15.20.540.6 In declining, the
court took note of evidence in the record attesting to the govern-
ment's prodigious efforts to run the station efficiently. 9
680. Id. at 558.
681. Id. at 565-66.
682. ALASKA STAT. § 15.56.030(a)(2)(1988).
683. Dansereau, 903 P.2d at 560.
684. L at 566.
685. Id. at 567.
686. Id. at 571.
687. Id.
688. Id. at 572; ALAsKA STAT. § 15.20.540 (1988).





In Nenana City School District v. Coghill,6 ° the Alaska
Supreme Court elucidated the interrelation among three statutes:
(1) Alaska Statutes section 14.20.160,691 which provides that a
teacher's tenure rights are lost when his or her employment in the
school district is interrupted or terminated; (2) Alaska Statutes
section 14.20.010,6" which provides that no one can be employed
in Alaska public schools without a valid teacher's certificate; and
(3) Alaska Statutes section 14.20.170,6' which provides that a
teacher may be dismissed at any time only for certain causes,
including "substantial noncompliance with the school laws of the
state.
694
Coghill was a tenured teacher, employed by the Nenana City
School District ("NCSD"), whose teacher's certification lapsed for
a two-month period 9.6 ' NCSD determined that because it was
illegal under Alaska Statutes section 14.20.170 for the school
district to employ Coghill as a full-time teacher during the lapse in
her certification, her maximum pay was that of a substitute teacher,
and she must remit the overpaid amount.696 NCSD also deter-
mined that Coghill had lost her tenure under Alaska Statutes
section 14.20.160.61 Coghill filed suit to regain tenure status and
to be relieved from reimbursement to the school district. Noting
that the certification "requirements which ... provide apparent
protection of the public, i.e., continuing education, background
check, and notification of arrest, were not in issue," the court found
that the two-month lapse in certification did not constitute
"substantial noncompliance" under section 14.20.170.698 Because
Coghill was not in "substantial noncompliance," she could not be
690. 898 P.2d 929 (Alaska 1995).
691. ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.160 (1992).
692. Id. § 14.20.010.
693. Id § 14.20.170.
694. Coghill 898 P.2d at 932-33.
695. Id. at 930.
696. Id. at 930-31.
697. Id.
698. IM at 934.
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dismissed.699 As a result, her employment could not be "inter-
rupted or terminated" under section 14.20.160.' 0 Thus, she did
not lose her tenure under that statute. 0 Consequently, she was
not overpaid during the lapse in her teaching certificate, and she
did not need to remit that sum to the school district.7°2
In North Slope Borough v. Barraza,703 the supreme court
held that the Alaska Constitution required a public employee
terminated without a pre-termination adversarial hearing to be paid
back pay for the period after termination through the date of the
post-termination curative hearing where the propriety of the
employee's termination was finally decided.' 4  Georgette
Barazza, an employee of North Slope Borough ("NSB") was
terminated, without a pre-termination adversarial hearing.0 5
Four months after a curative post-termination hearing was held, the
hearing officer issued an interim decision ruling that NSB had just
cause to terminate Barazza, but that her due process rights were
violated by NSB's failure to provide a pre-termination hearing.
The hearing officer awarded Barazza back pay through the final
date of the curative hearing but did not file findings of fact and
conclusions of law for four months.7" The interim decision stated
that the decision would not be effective until such findings were
filed. °7 Barazza challenged the hearing officer's ruling that back
pay was not due through the date that findings of fact and
conclusions of law were filed."' Because the propriety of Baraz-
za's termination was not determined with adequate certainty until
the interim decision, the court ruled she was entitled to back pay
up until the time when the interim decision was issued, not when
the detailed findings were filed.7 9 The court also found that the
four-month delay between the issuance of the interim decision and
699. Id. at 933.
700. Id.
701. Id.
702. Id. at 934.
703. 906 P.2d 1377 (Alaska 1995).
704. Id. at 1381.




709. Id. at 1381.
1996]
170 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:1
the detailed findings did not constitute an independent due process
violation.71°
In Public Safety Employees Ass'n, Local 92 v. State,711 the
supreme court reaffirmed both Public Employees' Local 71 v.
State712 and State v. Public Safety Employees Ass'n,713 holding
that an arbitrator's decision mandating payment under the Public
Employment Relations Act1 ("PERA") was ineffective until
funds were appropriated by the state legislature. A mandatory
interest arbitration proceeding was initiated pursuant to PERA
during collective bargaining negotiations between the state and the
Public Safety Employees Association." The arbitrator ordered
the state to pay certain employees geographic differential increases
commencing September 1, 1990. The state claimed it could not
comply because PERA required that the legislature appropriate the
funds necessary to pay the increase, and the legislature was not due
to meet until after September 1, 1990. The state decided not to
comply with the arbitrator's decision, and a later arbitration
imposed monetary penalties for failure to pay.716 The court held
that because the legislature could elect not to fund an arbitration
award, the arbitrator's decision under the PERA was ineffective
until funds were appropriated.7!17 Consequently, the court ruled
that any penalties for failure to pay would not accrue until the
legislature actually appropriated the funds."8
In State v. Meyer," the supreme court held that an order of
the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights closing a com-
plainant's case is judicially reviewable.7' Andrea Meyer filed a
gender discrimination complaint with the Commission against her
employer, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game."' Two
years later, the Commission's executive director issued a closing
order, finding that Meyer's claims were not supported by substan-
710. Id.
711. 895 P.2d 980 (Alaska 1995).
712. 775 P.2d 1062 (Alaska 1989).
713. 798 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1990).
714. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23A0.070-.260 (1990).
715. Public Safety Employees Ass'n, 895 P.2d at 982.
716. Id. at 983.
717. ld. at 986.
718. 1& at 987.
719. 906 P.2d 1365 (Alaska 1995).
720. Id at 1367.
721. Id.
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tial evidence. Meyer appealed the closing order to the superior
court, where the Department argued that such an order was not
appealable.7 2 The supreme court affirmed the superior court's
ruling that the closing order was reviewable and remanded Meyer's
claim for hearing before the Commission.7' The court reasoned
that while previous judicial interpretations of Alaska Statutes
section 18.80.135,2 which authorizes review of Commission orders,
did not contemplate a case closing order, a presumption of
reviewability must be applied.7' Applying this presumption, the
court ruled that a case closing order had the requisite finality to be
reviewable.7' The court further held that once a discrimination
complainant establishes a prima facie case, a hearing is warrant-
ed 727; the burden required to compel a hearing is less than the
burden required to prevail on the merits.7'
B. Workers' Compensation
In Chiropractors for Justice v. State,729 the supreme court
considered the constitutionality of a 1988 amendment to the Alaska
Workers' Compensation Act and a regulation promulgated by the
Alaska Workers' Compensation Board in accordance with the
Act.70 The amendment created new procedures for the payment
of workers' compensation benefits for "continuing and multiple
treatments of a similar nature" and required the Board to adopt
new standards for frequency of treatment.73' In response, the
Board promulgated Alaska Administrative Code title 8, .section
45.082,732 which established the maximum number of compensable
treatments under the Act, as well as the procedure for gaining
Board approval for treatments in excess of that maximum." In
1990, a group of chiropractors referring to themselves as "Chiro-
practors for Justice" filed suit against the state alleging that the
722. IL
723. Id. at 1377.
724. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.135 (1986).
725. Meyer, 906 P.2d at 1369-70.
726. Id. at 1370.
727. Id. at 1375.
728. Id. at 1376.
729. 895 P.2d 962 (Alaska 1995).
730. Id. at 965-66.
731. Id. (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.095(c) (1990)).
732. ALAsKA ADMiN. CODE tit. 8, § 45.082 (April 1991).
733. Chiropractors, 895 P.2d at 965.
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amendment and the corresponding regulation violated their equal
protection, due process and privacy rights, as well as the Act's
presumption of compensability.M
The supreme court disposed of the due process claim, noting
that the statute and regulation furthered several legitimate state
interests, including "curbing abuse by health providers and
claimants" and "saving jobs by reducing workers' compensation
premiums." '735 It also determined that the amendment and the
regulation bore a reasonable relationship to those interests.
736
The court then addressed the equal protection claim under its
sliding scale of review. Because the laws being challenged
regulated only the manner in which a physician may be compensat-
ed under the Act, the interest at issue was an economic one.
Therefore, it was entitled only to the minimum level of judicial
scrutiny. For the statute to be upheld, the state needed to show
only that it was pursuing legitimate objectives.737 The court
accepted the state's contention that the frequency standards were
enacted "to ensure the delivery of medical services at a reasonable
cost to the employers.""73  The court also found that the provi-
sions bore a fair and substantial relationship to this objective and,
thus, satisfied the nexus requirement of the equal protection
analysis.739
The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the
amendment and regulation impermissibly violated its members'
right to privacy. It noted that the privacy right is not absolute and
that in this instance the chiropractor's privacy interests were
outweighed by the state's "interest in preventing fraud and abuse
in the worker's compensation system."7' Finally, the court
dismissed the contention that the amendment violated the presump-
tion of compensability contained in the statute. It reasoned that
the legislature was free to narrow this presumption if it chose to do
SO.
7 41
734. Id. at 965-66.
735. Id. at 966.
736. Id
737. Id. at 969.
738. Id- at 971.
739. Id. at 972.
740. Id
741. Id at 973.
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In Williams v. State Department of Revenue,742 the supreme
court rejected plaintiff Mary Ann Williams's argument that the
Alaska Workers' Compensation Board unconstitutionally denied
her claim for stress-related mental injury. She claimed that Alaska
Statutes sections 23.30.120(c)743 and 23.30.265(17) T' were un-
constitutional745 because they deprived her of equal protection
and substantive due process by treating workers with mental
injuries differently from workers with physical injuries.7' Addi-
tionally, she argued that 23.30.265(17) was unconstitutionally vague
and ambiguous, violating her procedural due process right.7 47
The court rejected her substantive due process claim, holding
that the legislature made a "rational policy decision" when it
enacted the amendments because mental injuries differ from
physical injuries in that they are more difficult to verify and "more
susceptible to fraud and abuse."7' The court also rejected her
equal protection argument.749 Using the sliding-scale test required
by the Alaska Constitution's equal protection clause, the court held
that workers' compensation benefits "are merely an economic
interest, and therefore, are entitled only to minimum protection
under this court's equal protection analysis."7' Because the
statute's distinction between mental injuries, which are hard to
diagnose, and physical injuries, which are easier to diagnose, had
a "fair and substantial relationship" to the Act's purpose of
ensuring "quick, efficient and fair" benefits to injured workers, the
court held that these amendments did not violate equal protec-
tion. 5 Finally, because the statute involved is not criminal, and
742. 895 P.2d 99 (Alaska 1995).
743. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.120(c) (1990).
744. Id. § 23.30.265(17).
745. Williams, 895 P.2d at 99-100. Section 23.30.265(17) specifies that mental
injury is not compensable unless "the work stress was extraordinary and unusual
in comparison to pressures and tensions experienced by individuals in a
comparable work environment, and... the work stress was the predominant cause
of the mental injury." ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.265(17) (1990). Section 23.30.120(c)
abandons the presumption of compensability for claims of stress-induced mental
injury. Md § 23.30.120(c).
746. Williams, 895 P2d at 101.
747. Id.
748. Id. at 103.
749. Id.
750. Id. at 103-04 (footnote omitted).
751. Id. at 104 (quoting Gilmore v. Alaska Workers' Compensation Board, 882
P.2d 922, 927 (Alaska 1994)).
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it "is not so conflicting and confused that it cannot be given
meaning in the adjudication process, ' '752 it did not violate proce-
dural due process. 3
In Williams v. Mammoth of Alaska, Inc., the supreme court
applied Alaska Statutes section 23.30.055, the exclusive remedy
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act ("Act"),755 holding
that a general partner in a limited partnership qualified as an
"employer" within the meaning of the Act and was thus immune
from tort liability arising from an employee's fatal on-the-job
accident. The employee's estate contended that the general
partner, B.C.S.C., Inc., was acting as a separate corporate entity,
and was not entitled to immunity under section 23.30.055.756 The
court rejected this argument, ruling that partners were not legal
entities separate from the partnership because-the partners had
equal rights in the management of the partnership's business. 75 7
The court reasoned that where the employer is a partnership, each
partner is an employer of the partnership's employees. Conse-
quently, each partner was entitled to immunity under section
23.30.055.758
In Huf v. Arctic Alaska Drilling Co., Inc.,5 9 the supreme
court refined the rule of Williams v. Mammoth of Alaska,76
which provides that the employee of a partnership is also the
employee of each partner for the purposes of the exclusive liability
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act."6 It held that an
employee of the partnership is not the employee of a partner
"where [that] partner acts negligently outside of and not in the
course of the partnership business. Thus, where the partner is
negligent outside the course of partnership business, it does not
benefit from the exclusive liability provision and is subject to tort
liability. '762 In this case, Arctic Alaska Drilling Co. ("AADCO")
constructed an oil rig prior to forming a partnership with Pool
752. Ld. at 105.
753. Id. at 105-06.
754. 890 P.2d 581 (Alaska 1995).
755. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1990).
756. Williams, 890 P.2d at 583.
757. IL at 584.
758. Id. at 585.
759. 890 P.2d 579 (Alaska 1995).
760. 890 P.2d 581 (Alaska 1995).
761. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1994).
762. Huf, 890 P.2d at 580.
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Alaska, Inc. After the partnership was formed, a partnership
employee was injured due to AADCO's pre-partnership negligence
in building the oil-rig. Since the negligence occurred "prior to the
formation of and obviously not in the course of the business of the
partnership," AADCO was not immune from a negligence suit by
the partnership's employee.' 6s
In another case involving the exclusive remedy provision,
Sauve v. Winfree,764 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the
provision does not grant co-employee immunity to the officers of
a corporation who are sued in their capacity as landlords.
76s
Having suffered injuries in a fall down a staircase at her place of
employment, plaintiff Sauve collected workers' compensation
benefits. Notwithstanding the exclusive remedy provided by
workers' compensation for work-related injuries, she also brought
suit against two officers of the corporation for which she worked,
alleging that they had breached their duty as landlords. The two
officers owned the business's premises through a separate partner-
ship, which they owned in its entirety.
766
The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, holding that the exclusive remedy provision 767 barred
the suit because the defendants were the plaintiff's co-employ-
ees.76s The supreme court reversed, finding that "policy concerns
and the purpose of the legislation" dictated that immunity should
not extend to persons solely because they happen to be co-
employees.769 Specifically, noted the court, the superior court's
holding would encourage landowners to adopt corporate forms that
would render them "'paper' co-employees" in order to avoid their
common law duties.770
The supreme court also defined the scope of co-employee
immunity under the statute, holding that such immunity should
apply only where the conduct underlying the action arises "out of
763. Id. at 581.
764. 907 P.2d 7 (Alaska 1995).
765. Id. at 9.
766. Id. at 7.
767. The provision provides that "[t]he liability of an employer prescribed in
[section] 23.30.045 is exclusive and in place of all other liability of the employer
and any fellow employee to the employee." Id. at 9 (citing ALASKA STAT.
§23.30.055 (1990)).
768. Id.
769. Id. at 9.
770. Id. at 10.
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and in the course of employment.""' In doing so, the court
adopted the regular workers' compensation "course of employ-
ment" standard, rather than the vicarious liability "course of
employment" standard. It stated that "'if the accidental injury or
death is connected with any of the incidents of one's employment,
then the injury or death would both arise out of and be in the
course of such employment."' 7
The court reversed the superior court's grant of summary
judgment and remanded the case for determination of whether
Sauve's injuries occurred in the course of her employment.773
In Sumner v. Eagle Nest Hotel,774 the supreme court conclud-
ed that Alaska Statutes sections 23.30.155(b)75 and (e)776 are
applicable in determining the due date for lump-sum permanent
partial impairment ("PPI") payments. The court recognized that
section 23.30.155(b) and (e) do not specifically apply to PPI
payments. However, after examining workers' compensation law
as it existed prior to 1988, the court found an "historical basis for
applying section [23.30.155] time periods" to PPI. Thus, the court
noted that a lump-sum PPI payment was due within twenty-one
days after an employer is notified that an employee has been
classified as having a PPI. 777
In Gibeau v. Kollsman Instrument Co.,7 78 the supreme court
held that a workers' compensation claimant's attorney was not
entitled to a lump-sum fee based upon the present value of the
claimant's future disability benefits. The Alaska workers' compen-
sation attorney's fees statute779 does not specify whether fees
771. Id. at 11 (quoting Northern Corp. v. Saari, 409 P.2d 845, 846 (Alaska
1966)).
772. Id. (quoting Northern, 409 P.2d at 846.)
773. Id. at 14.
774. 894 P.2d 628 (Alaska 1995).
775. Alaska Statutes section 23.30.155(b) provides that the first installment of
workers' compensation is due on the fourteenth day after the employer is notified
of the employee's injury or death.
776. Alaska Statutes section 23.30.155(e) provides that a penalty will be assessed
if a workers' compensation payment is not made within seven days after it
becomes due.
777. Sumner, 894 P.2d at 631. The court also concluded that when an insurer
contests a doctor's conclusion that an employee has a PPI, and the controversion
does not delay payment, the controversion does not provide a basis for a penalty,
even if it was made in bad faith. ld.
778. 896 P.2d 822 (Alaska 1995).
779. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.145(a) (1990).
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should be paid periodically or in a lump sum."' However, "fees
based on a percentage of an award cannot be presently calculated
where substantial uncertainties exist as to the value of the
award." '781 The claimant was awarded permanent total disability
benefits to be distributed in biweekly installments but only as long
as the claimant lived and continued to be unable to work due to his
disability.78 The claimant's future benefits could also be reduced
or eliminated if the claimant were to recover damages from a third-
party tortfeasor.78 The court held that because the total amount
of compensation awarded to the claimant is unknown at the time
of the award, the "percentage fees based on an award payable for
an indefinite number of installments cannot be reduced to a lump
sum.57
8 4
In Osborne Construction Co. v. Jordan,785 the supreme court
held that where an employee suffers a work-related injury and then
suffers an aggravation unrelated to his employment, the employee's
claim still receives the workers' compensation statutory presump-
tion of compensability, unless the employer can present sufficient
affirmative evidence to rule out the work-relatedness of the
employee's injury.786 The court rejected the employer's claim
that the presumption of compensability was rebutted because the
disability claim was filed after a non-work-related injury.7 The
court noted that "the fact that an employee has suffered a non-
work-related injury does not, standing alone, rebut the presumption
of compensability. 7 8
IX. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
In State v. Arnariak,89 the Alaska Court of Appeals exam-
ined when a state regulation will "relate to" the taking of wildlife
such that it will be preempted by the Marine Mammal Protection





785. 904 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1995).
786. Id at 391-92.
787. Id. at 390.
788. Id. (citing Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Turner, 611 P.2d 12, 14 (Alaska
1980)).
789. 893 P.2d 1273 (Alaska 1995).
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Act ("MMPA"). 790 The MMPA states that "no state may en-
force, or attempt to enforce, any state law relating to the taking of
any species . . . of marine mammal within the State unless the
secretary has transferred authority for the conservation and
management of that species.., to the State. ' 791 The court held
that the Alaska Administrative Code, title 5, section 92.066,79
which restricts access to Round Island to those holding a state-
issued permit, and section 92.066(2)(D),79 which prohibits the
discharge of firearms, the disturbance or harassment of wildlife, and
the removal of wildlife or parts of wildlife from Round Island, were
not merely land use regulations, but were sufficiently "related to"
the taking of wildlife to be preempted by a broad reading of the
MVIPA's preemption language.9 Thus, the court of appeals
upheld the trial court's decision to dismiss the prosecution of two
persons charged under the Alaska regulations.79s
In Tulkisarmute Native Community Council v. Heinze,796 the
supreme court reviewed a decision of the Department of Natural
Resources to extend permits for the appropriation of water in the
Tuluksk River and held that the regulatory standard in title 11,
section 93.120(f) of the Alaska Administrative Code," which
requires an applicant for permit extension to demonstrate "diligent
effort toward completing the appropriation," satisfies the more
general statutory standard in Alaska Statutes section 46.15.10,79'
which grants an extension for "good cause shown. '799 The court
reviewed the Department's decision under the "arbitrary and
capricious or abuse of discretion standard,"' finding the decision
arbitrary because the Department's rationale for extending the
permit was "not related to the diligent effort criterion contained in
790. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421(h) (1994).
791. Id. at § 1379(a).
792. ALASKA ADMiN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.066 (July 1995 & Supp. Jan. 1996).
793. Id. § 92.066(2)(D).
794. Arnariak, 893 P.2d at 1277.
795. Id.
796. 898 P.2d 935 (Alaska 1995).
797. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 93.120(f) (Jan. 1996).
798. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.10 (1995).
799. 898 P.2d at 943. The court also reviewed several factual determinations by
the Department under the substantial evidence test. Id.




[section] 93.120(f)." 0' 1 To meet the "diligent effort" requirement,
the court determined that the Department should have required the
holder of the permits "to describe the work which had been done
to perfect the appropriation, show how the water had been
beneficially used, or, at a minimum, explain why no use had yet
been made, and state precisely why additional time was need-
ed."8" The supreme court also suggested that the permit holder
might have satisfied the "diligent effort" requirement for the entire
water appropriation project (covering a web of several streams) by
demonstrating diligent efforts on a few streams, rather than each
individual stream."0 3 However, the court found that the permit
holder had not shown diligence on any river; thus, it did not need
to determine "on how many individual streams a permittee must




In Compton v. Compton, °" the Alaska Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's ruling that despite the provisions of a
prenuptial agreement, the parties' actions during marriage could be
evidence of their intent to convert separate property into marital
property."6 During the Comptons' marriage, William Compton
co-mingled his separate premarital property with funds in a marital
bank account °7 and spent some of his separate property in
remodeling Gaff Compton's house, which was the marital
home.0 8 Although William testified that he never gave any
indication to Gail that the premarital property was to remain
separate property,0 9 he argued that the premarital agreement
entitled him to reimbursement because it provided that "each party
will keep, as that party's sole and separate property, all of that
801. Id at 946.
802. ML at 943.
803. Id. at 945-46.
804. Md at 946.
805. 902 P.2d 805 (Alaska 1995).
806. Id. at 810.
807. Id. at 807.
808. Id. at 811.
809. Id. at 810-11.
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party's premarital property."' 0 The supreme court rejected this
argument, determining that the prenuptial agreement did not
preclude conversion of separate property into marital property."'
Therefore, the disputed property had been converted and William
was not entitled to reimbursement."'
In Rodriguez v. Rodriguez,13 the supreme court held that
marital property included property acquired during a period of
separation if that separation did not lead to divorce. 14 Earlier,
the court had held, in Schanck v. Schanck"1 5 that marital property
did not include property acquired during a period of separation
that led to the final divorce if the spouse used money earned
during the separation to purchase the property."1 6 Rolando
Rodriguez relied on Schanck to argue that a house he purchased
while he and Julieta Rodriguez were separated was not part of the
marital property." The court held that this interpretation was
incorrect since Rolando and Julieta had "reconciled after their
informal separation, without ever filing for divorce, and [had] lived
together as husband and wife" in the house for three years after
their separation.18
The court also held that marital property should be valued at
the time of trial, not at the time of the final separation. 19
Rolando Rodriguez argued that the home he had purchased should
be valued at the time of their final separation instead of the date
of the trial.' The court rejected this argument,"1 citing Ogard
v. Ogards for the proposition that property should be valued at
the date of separation only when the sole efforts of one spouse
resulted in the increase in the value of the property.82 The court
found that rising property values do not constitute the sole efforts
810. Id. at 809 n.3.
811. Id. at 811.
812. Id.
813. 908 P.2d 1007 (Alaska 1995).
814. Id. at 1012-13.
815. 717 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1986).
816. Rodriguez, 908 P.2d at 1012.
817. Id.
818. Id.
819. Id. at 1012-13.
820. Id. at 1012.
821. Id
822. 808 P.2d 815, 819-20 (Alaska 1991).
823. Rodriguez, 908 P.2d at 1012.
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of one spouse even if that spouse were responsible for the
mortgage payments.s24
In Davila v. Davila,' the supreme court held that the trial
court erred in awarding reorientation alimony for a period longer
than one year.' The supreme court concluded that reorientation
alimony should be awarded in excess of one year only in cases
where exceptional circumstances warrant a longer duration, and no
facts on the record reflected such circumstances 27  The court
clarified the rule that reorientation alimony should be awarded only
when the marital property cannot be easily divided to provide for
both parties and should only last until the property can be divided
or until a spouse finds a job that fits his or her skills.'
In Saltz v. Saltz, 29 the supreme court held that although
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82(b) does not apply to divorce
cases in general, it does apply to actions to reduce a spousal
support obligation to judgment. Therefore, in such an action, a
party may recover attorney fees. 30
In Wainwright v. Wainwright,"1 the supreme court held that,
in a divorce proceeding, a spouse's nonvested pension may be
divided for immediate allocation between the parties if the
employee-spouse agrees to assume the risk that the pension might
not vest. 32  This holding was in direct contrast to the court's
decision in Laing v. Laing,33 a case in which the court decided to
retain jurisdiction and postpone the division of a pension until it
had vested.' In Laing, the supreme court recognized that if a
pension were reduced to its present value and the non-employee
spouse were to receive a lump-sum payment, the employee spouse
would unfairly bear the risk that the pension would not vest. The
Wainwright court distinguished Laing by noting that this unfair risk
burden was alleviated because the employee spouse was willing to
assume the risk of nonvesting. Therefore, the general rule that
824. Id. at 1012-13.
825. 908 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1995).
826. Id. at 1027.
827. Id.
828. Id. at 1026-27.
829. 903 P.2d 1070 (Alaska 1995).
830. Id. at 1071; ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(b).
831. 888 P.2d 762 (Alaska 1995).
832. Id. at 765.
833. 741 P.2d 649 (Alaska 1987).
834. Id. at 658.
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financial matters should be settled at the conclusion of a divorce
trial was controlling.835
K.E. v. JW.836 involved a mother, K.E., who claimed that her
ex-husband, J.W., should be equitably estopped from denying
paternity to L.E., K.E.'s daughter. L.E. was conceived through
natural insemination with the help of a surrogate father. At the
time of the conception, K.E. and J.W. were dating, but J.W. could
not father a child as a result of a vasectomy. Soon after K.E.
became pregnant, K.E. and J.W. were married. After filing for
divorce, K.E. filed this action to create a child support obligation
for J.W. 3
7
The supreme court noted that in order for an equitable
estoppel claim to be successful, the plaintiff must show "(1)
representation of a position by conduct or word, (2) reasonable
reliance thereon by another party, and (3) resulting prejudice." '838
To establish prejudice, the plaintiff must show that "(1) the child
may be deprived of the mother's potential action to hold the
natural father responsible for the support of the child, (2) the child
may suffer serious and lasting emotional injury from the denial of
paternity or (3) the child may suffer a social injury from the
removal of legitimacy." 9 The court concluded that K.E. could
not satisfy any of these requirements and dismissed the action
because K.E. could still bring a paternity action against L.E.'s
natural father. It reasoned that because (1) J.W. had only spent
between 90 and 180 days with L.E. after she was born and (2) J.W.
had never claimed to be her legitimate father, "the paternal
relationship [between them] could not have been truly established,"
and, thus, L.E. never had any status of legitimacy to lose.
B. Child Custody
In Howlett v. Howlett, 4l the Alaska Supreme Court held that
in a custody suit the best interests of a child should take prece-
dence over the failure of a party to comply with a procedural rule.
835. Wainwright, 888 P.2d at 765-66.
836. 899 P.2d 133 (Alaska 1995).
837. Id. at 134.
838. Id. (citing Jamison v. Consolidated Utilities, Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 102 (Alaska
1978)).
839. Id. at 135.
840. Id.
841. 890 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1995).
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Viveca Stone (formerly Howlett) was originally granted custody of
her daughter Hilary after her divorce from Steven Howlett. Steven
later filed a motion requesting that he be given custody of his
daughter. Viveca's late response constituted a failure to comply
with the ten-day time limit established by Alaska Rules of Civil
Procedure 77(c)(1) and (2). 42 This failure prompted the superior
court to grant custody of Hilary to Steven. 3
The supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that
"[f]ailure to follow Rule 77's specific requirements does not relieve
the superior court of its duty to exercise its independent judgment
to determine if Steven's motion to modify child custody support
should be granted."'  The superior court should have made fact
findings and legal conclusions to determine whether a change in
circumstances had occurred that would warrant a custody change
that was in the child's best interest.845
In Rogers v. Rogers, 46 the supreme court reversed the
superior court's decision to decline jurisdiction over a child custody
proceeding. The court held that under the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, 7 a court has jurisdiction to make a child
custody determination if "the state in which the court sits is the
child's home state, or had been the child's home state within six
months before commencement of the proceeding.., and a parent
... continues to live in [the] state."'  Further, the court held
that the superior court abused its discretion in declining to exercise
jurisdiction because it was in the child's best interest to have the
custody proceedings take place in Alaska."49
In Strother v. State,85 the court of appeals concluded that
where "two parents... retain equal right to physical custody of a
child, one parent may commit the crime of custodial interference
by keeping and concealing a child from the other parent. '851
Timothy Strother appealed a conviction for first-degree custodial
interference, arising from his actions of removing his daughter from
842. ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 77.
843. Howlett, 890 P.2d at 1126.
844. Id. at 1127.
845. Id.
846. 907 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1995).
847. ALAsKA STAT. § 25.30.010 (1994).
848. Rogers, 907 P.2d at 471.
849. Id. at 472.
850. 891 P.2d 214 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
851. Id. at 220.
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Alaska and hiding the child from her mother."2 Strother argued
that, absent a court decree defining the legal rights of the parents,
no parent can violate the statute prohibiting custodial interfer-
enceY The court observed that, because the purpose of the
custodial interference statute was to protect custodians from
deprivation of their custody rights, the legal status of the defendant
was not the focus of the crime." The court ultimately concluded
that "when a child is entrusted to joint custodians, neither custodi-
an may take exclusive physical custody of the child in a manner
that defeats the rights of the other joint custodian."" s Applying
this rule, the court found that, although Strother's removal of the
child was within his authority, "keeping" the child hidden from her
mother was unlawful and constituted the actus reus of custodial
interference." 6
C. Child Support
In Miller v. Miller,857 the Alaska Supreme Court held that a
father is entitled to have credited against his child support
obligations "children's insurance benefits" paid to his daughter
pursuant to his social security benefits.5 8 The court noted that
"'the overwhelming majority of states that have considered this
issue allow a credit for social security benefits paid to dependent
children."'859 Moreover, because the purpose of Alaska Rule of
Civil Procedure 90.386 is to ensure that the needs of the child are
met,86' the court determined that "'the actual source of the
payments is of no concern to the party having custody as long as
they are in fact made.""'86  The court also held that because the
father would be credited for the social security benefits received by
his daughter, the benefits must be included as income in calculating
852. Id at 216-17.
853. Id. at 222.
854. Strother, 891 P.2d at 220-21.
855. 1& at 223.
856. Id. at 224.
857. 890 P.2d 574 (Alaska 1995).
858. Id. at 576.
859. I& (quoting Pontbriand v. Pontbriand, 622 A.2d 482 (R.I. 1993)).
860. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3 (setting out procedures for determining child
support obligations).
861. Id. commentary I(B).
862. Miller, 890 P.2d at 577 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 449 A.2d 947 (Vt. 1982)).
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the father's child support obligation in order to avoid granting him
a windfall.863
In Sanders v. Sanders," the supreme court held that the
formula under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.38" for calculat-
ing child support applies to a determination of support under
Alaska Statutes section 25.24.140(a)(3), 6 which provides for
support, under special circumstances, of children who have reached
their eighteenth birthday. 67 The court also held that "an adult
disabled child's 'ability to provide for herself out of her own means
must always be considered' when determining whether a parent has
a continuing duty of support for that child."' '
In State v. Allsop,8 69 the supreme court held that the Child
Support Enforcement Division ("CSED") was a proper defendant
in an action by a man to disestablish his paternity of a child.870
CSED was proper because (1) CSED had pursued him for child
support, 1 (2) he had a statutorily created entitlement to seek
relief from CSED's actions in court, 2 (3) the basis for this relief
was his nonparentage, 73 and (4) CSED had a real interest in the
paternity of the child because the mother had assigned to CSED
her rights to support "from all sources."'
In another case involving the CSED, State Department of
Revenue v. Dunning,875 the supreme court held that the CSED
exceeded its statutory authority by administratively creating a child
support order independent and different from a child support court
order of another state. 6  Under Alaska Statutes section 25.-
27.020(a)(7), CSED is "authorized to establish and enforce
863. Id. at 578.
864. 902 P.2d 310 (Alaska 1995).
865. ALASKA R. Cxv. P. 90.3.
866. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.140(a)(3).
867. Sanders, 902 P.2d at 314.
868. Id. at 315 (quoting Sayne v. Sayne, 284 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1955)).
869. 902 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1995).
870. Id.
871. Id.
872. Id.; see ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.210 (1991), amended by 1995 SLA ch. 57
§ 17; ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.270 (1991), repealed by 1995 SLA cl. 57 § 17.
873. Allsop, 902 P.2d at 794.
874. Id. at 794-95.
875. 907 P.2d I (Alaska 1995).
876. ld. at 7.
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administratively.., child support orders from other jurisdictions
pertaining to obligors within the state."'  The court rejected
CSED's claim that this statute gave it the authority to establish an
administrative order against an in-state obligor for child support
despite the existence of a child support order against the same
obligor from a different state.8  The court ruled that "[n]othing
in the language of the statute can be reasonably construed to
confer upon CSED the power to create an independent order of a
different amount against an in-state obligor when there is an
existing out-of-state child support court order." 9
In State Department of Revenue v. Dean,8 0 the supreme
court held that Alaska Statutes section 09.10.040,8 l the statute of
limitations applicable to "an action upon a judgment,""s does not
apply to a motion to reduce child support payments to judgment.
The court concluded that the payments, which had accrued more
than ten years earlier, were not subject to the statute of limitations
because "the [Child Support Enforcement Division] did not initiate
a new 'action' to establish [the defendant's] liability."" s Instead,
"each proceeding was an aid of enforcement of a judgment which
was already in existence.""a  On remand, the Child Support
Enforcement Division would be able to sustain its action against
the defendants if it could show that it had satisfied the requirement
in Alaska Statutes section 09.35.02081 that there was "just and
sufficient reasons for the failure to obtain the writ of execu-
tion"8 6 in a more timely manner18 7
XI. PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND
In Brodigan v. Alaska Department of Revenue,"s the Alaska
Supreme Court held that the Alaska Department of Revenue acted
within its statutory authority in adopting title 15, section 23.175 of
877. ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.020(a)(7) (1995).
878. Dunning, 907 P.2d at 4.
879. IM.
880. 902 P.2d 1321 (Alaska 1995).
881. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.040 (1983).
882. Dean, 902 P.2d at 1322.
883. Id. at 1324.
884. Id.
885. ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.020 (1994).
886. Id
887. Dean, 902 P.2d at 1325-26.
888. 900 P.2d 728 (Alaska 1995).
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the Alaska Administrative Code,889 pursuant to which absence
from the state for medical treatment is not an allowable absence
for the purposes of permanent fund dividend eligibility where the
treatment includes a seasonal change of residence."g The court
concluded that the regulation was both reasonable and consistent
with the statutory purpose of Alaska Statutes section 43.23.095-
(8)(D),89 which is to ensure that payment of dividends is limited
to permanent residents."9 The court explained that the regula-
tion, by excluding medical absences involving a seasonal change of
residence, reasonably defines the statutory term "medical treat-
ment" so that eligibility for dividends is limited to those permanent
residents who are temporarily outside the state while actively
attempting to treat their medical conditions.93 In this case, the
Brodigans were absent from Alaska for the majority of the year
due to a physician's advice that Mr. Brodigan should spend colder
winter months in a warmer climate.894 The court noted that
although "prolonged absence from Alaska can be appropriate when
some 'specific therapeutic application by medical personnel' is
necessary," medical treatment does not include "a seasonal absence
from the state on the advice of one's doctor."8 95
In another case involving the effect of absence from the state
on eligibility for dividend payments, State Department of Revenue,
Permanent Fund Division v. Bradley, 96 the supreme court held
that Alaska Administrative Code title 15, section 23.175(c)(2)"9
is consistent with Alaska Statutes section 43.23.095(8)(B).8 18
Section 43.23.095(8)(B) allows those absent from the state to be
residents for permanent fund dividend purposes if they are "absent
only for.., secondary or postsecondary education." 9 9 Section
23.175(c)(2) defines this to mean that the applicant must be
enrolled full-time in an accredited institution.9" Bradley, whose
889. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.175(c)(6) (repealed 1993).
890. 900 P.2d at 732.
891. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.095(8)(D) (1990).
892. Brodigan, 900 P.2d at 732.
893. Id.
894. Id. at 731.
895. Id. (quoting the superior court opinion).
896. 896 P.2d 237 (Alaska 1995).
897. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.175(c)(2) (repealed 1993).
898. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.095(8)(B) (1995).
899. Id.
900. Bradley, 896 P.2d at 238-39.
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permanent fund dividend application was denied because he was a
part-time student out-of-state, challenged this regulation because it
excluded applicants, such as himself whom he claimed fell within
the literal language of the statute."1 The court rejected this
argument, noting that one of the duties in promulgating regulations
is to give content to the statutory standard.9" The regulation
simply provided guidelines for determining whether or not an
individual is absent from the state "only" for education.9°
Bradley also claimed that the regulation was arbitrary because
each school might have different definitions for "full-time stu-
dent."'" The court rejected this contention, holding that, as the
regulation requires that the school be accredited, it ensures that the
school's attendance standards will be legitimate. 5 Finally, the
court held that a regulation is not unreasonable because it may
possibly exclude a deserving applicant.9 6
In State Department of Revenue v. Merriouns °7 the supreme
court ruled that applicants for Permanent Fund Dividends had
submitted satisfactory written opposition to the denial of their
applications when they submitted a letter alleging that the untimely
filing of their original applications with the Permanent Fund
Dividend Division was attributable to "human error" on the part
of the postal service.9"
The supreme court also interpreted as non-exclusive the list of
proof found in Alaska Administrative Code title 15, section
23.135(c), which provides that "[a]n application postmarked [after
March 31 but before July 1 of the dividend year] is considered
timely filed [if the applicant can produce certain listed forms of
proof]." 9°9  The court permitted the applicants to submit two
affidavits of persons who claimed to have witnessed the actual,
timely mailing of their applications.9 0
901. kd at 239.
902. 1d
903. Id. at 239-40.
904. Id. at 240.
905. Id.
906. Id.
907. 894 P.2d 623 (Alaska 1995).
908. Id. at 625.






In Estate of Lampert v. Estate of Lampert,9 ' the Alaska
Supreme Court held that a promisee is entitled to rescission of a
postnuptial estate-planning agreement and restitution where there
is total failure of consideration with respect to the postnuptial
agreement. In the case, a wife's sole obligation under an agree-
ment was to leave her husband a life estate in certain property.
912
However, she secretly changed her will so that her husband would
not receive the life estate upon her death. The court determined
that this breach went to the essence of the bargain.13 Therefore,
the husband's estate was entitled to rescission and to the restora-
tion of all benefits conferred upon the estate of the wife.914
In Kalenka v. Taylor,915 the supreme court addressed several
issues related to the enforcement of restrictive covenants. A
husband and wife had recorded restrictive covenants jointly as
"developer" of a subdivision, and the wife sold several lots
subsequent to a divorce. First, the court refined the standard for
waiver of covenants adopted in B.B.P Corp. v. Carroll,16 which
held that a covenant would be considered waived if the "evidence
reveals substantial and general noncompliance. 9 17  The court
found that failure to enforce the covenant against a single property
does not constitute waiver under this standard.918
Second, the court applied a strict construction rule to cove-
nants, interpreting them in favor of the free use of land. Thus, the
court interpreted the covenants to permit the building of single
family homes, even though the covenant clearly contemplated only
duplexes, as single family homes were not expressly prohibited.91 9
With respect to damages for covenant breaches, the court held
that breaches of covenant claims are essentially contractual in
nature. Because punitive damages are unavailable in a contract
911. 896 P.2d 214 (Alaska 1995).
912. Id. at 219.
913. Id.
914. Id. at 220.
915. 896 P.2d 222 (Alaska 1995).
916. 760 P.2d 519 (Alaska 1988).
917. Kalenka, 896 P.2d at 226 (quoting B.B.P. Corp. v. Carroll, 760 P.2d 519
(Alaska 1988)).
918. Id.
919. Id. at 227.
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claim, they cannot be assessed for covenant breaches, even if the
breach is wilful.9' Finally, the court examined "assessed penal-
ties" provisions of the covenants and concluded that they contem-
plated impermissible liquidated damages. The "assessed penalties"
were impermissible because they did not attempt to calculate the
actual damages that might be sustained by a breach. Instead, they
assessed the same harsh penalties for a range of breaches.92'
In Sharpe v. Trail,9" the supreme court held that the deter-
mination of whether a landlord acted in good faith in evicting a
tenant from a mobile home park must be made without an inquiry
into the landlord's underlying motives.9" Appealing from sum-
mary judgment that held that their eviction from a mobile home
park was not wrongful, Jeff and Debbie Sharpe argued that a
mobile home lot's conversion into a parking area was not a
sufficient "change in the use of the land," a requirement for
eviction under Alaska Statutes section 34.03.225.924 They also
argued that the eviction violated the good-faith-in-eviction
requirement of Alaska Statutes section 34.03.320.' z
The court affirmed the superior court's holding that the
landlord's use of the land for parking commercial vehicles, travel
trailers and recreational vehicles constituted "a change in the use
of the land."9' Without citing any authority, the court also held
that "[u]nder the statutory definition of good faith, if the [landlord]
honestly decided to change the "use of [the land]-in other words,
if they acted with 'honesty in fact' in undertaking the change in
use-their underlying motives for doing so were immaterial."927
In State v. Teller Native Corp.,' the supreme court held that
where the state, as lessee, specifically agrees to build improvements
on certain leased property and leaves them there at the termination
of the lease, the state must compensate the lessor for the value of
920. Id. at 228.
921. Id. at 229.
922. 902 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1995).
923. Ld. at 308.
924. Id. at 305-06. Alaska Statutes section 34.03.225 authorizes the owner of
a mobile home park to evict a tenant if the owner desires to "make a change in
the use of the land comprising the mobile home park." ALASKA
STAT. § 34.03.225(a)(4) (1995).
925. Sharpe, 902 P.2d at 306; ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.320 (1995).
926. Sharpe, 902 P.2d at 307.
927. Id. at 308.
928. 904 P.2d 847 (Alaska 1995).
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the improvements if the state condemns the property before the
expiration of the lease.929 In Teller, the state had leased certain
property from the United States. As part of its consideration for
the lease, the state agreed to build an airport on the site. Subse-
quently, the United States conveyed the leased property to the
Teller Native Corporation ("TNC"). Seven years later, the state
commenced proceedings to condemn land that included the lease
property.930
The court determined that TNC was the successor to the
United States's interest in the lease. The court also concluded that
the state had agreed with the United States that the state would, in
consideration for the lease, build the airport, and at the end of the
lease, the United States would retain all unremovable improve-
ments. Thus, the court concluded that TNC owned the improve-
ments and should be compensated for their value. 3'
In Nielson v. Benton,932 the supreme court held that where
the state has a colorable claim over part of a parcel of land, it
constitutes a cloud on the title regardless of its validity.933 Benton
had agreed to purchase Nielson's property but reserved the
unconditional right to revoke the agreement if any clouds on the
title were found.9 4 The supreme court agreed with the superior
court that where a lawsuit is necessary to determine title to a part
of the property, there is a cloud on the title.935 The court stated
that the test for determining whether there is a cloud on the title
is "whether the owner would be required to offer evidence to
defeat an action based on the alleged cloud."936  The court
further stated that the "unconditional" power retained by Benton
meant that he did not have to give Nielson an opportunity to cure
title.937
In Voss v. Brooks,938 the supreme court determined that a
deed to real property made subsequent to a contrary oral contract
929. Id. at 850.
930. IM2 at 849.
931. Id. at 853-54.
932. 903 P.2d 1049 (Alaska 1995).
933. Id. at 1052.
934. Id. at 1051.
935. Id. at 1052.
936. Id. at 1053.
937. Id.
938. 907 P.2d 465 (Alaska 1995).
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nullified the oral agreement.939 The dispute arose out of an
alleged promise by Richard Voss to grant sole title to certain real
property to Katherine Brooks if Brooks would move to Alaska and
build on the property a house in which Voss, Brooks and Brooks's
two children would live.9" After construction on the house
began in 1983, Voss executed a deed transferring the property to
himself and Brooks as "joint tenants."94' Brooks and Voss lived
in the house together until 1988 when Voss moved out.942 Voss
was subsequently denied access to both the house and his personal
property, and in 1991 he sued for partition of the property.943 On
appeal, the supreme court noted that under traditional principles
of contract and property law, "rights under a contract to convey
property are said to be merged into a subsequent deed."9" The
court explained that if an unambiguous deed contradicts a previous
agreement, it is the deed that controls.945 Applying the merger
doctrine, the court held that Brooks's acceptance of the deed
extinguished her rights under the oral agreement. Therefore Voss
could proceed with his action for partition.
946
In K & L Distributors, Inc. v. Kelly Electric, Inc.,947 the
supreme court concluded that, even where the language of a deed
of trust is insufficient to give a deed of trust beneficiary a security
interest in fixtures on the trusted real property, "the general
common law rule is that '[w]hen a fixture becomes complemental
to real property, it becomes.., part of the realty, [and] the fixture
becomes part of the security with regard to any existing [deed of
trust]. ''94  In light of this rule, the court determined that the
beneficiary of the deed of trust on the real property to which the
fixtures were attached had a security interest in the fixtures that
939. l at 466.
940. IL
941. Id. Under Alaska law, any attempt, such as this, by unmarried persons to
create a joint tenancy in property, results in a tenancy in common. Id. at 468 n.2.
942. Id. at 467.
943. Id.
944. Id. at 468.
945. Id.
946. Id.
947. 908 P.2d 429 (Alaska 1995).
948. Id. at 432-33.
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was superior to the interest of an unsecured creditor that had
removed them from the premises.9 49
XIII. TAX
In Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Associated Grocers, Inc.,95
the Alaska Supreme Court invalidated a municipal ordinance
imposing personal liability for a former business owner's delinquent
sales taxes on a successor owner who had taken possession of the
business pursuant to a Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization
plan.951 The court relied on Alaska Statutes section
29.45.650(e),5 z which authorizes boroughs to create liens to
secure payment of sales taxes, but gives priority to liens perfected
prior to the recording of the sales tax lien.9 3 The court held that
although the municipal ordinance did not specifically impose a lien,
its impact was even more drastic than a lien, thus violating the lien
priorities of Alaska Statutes section 29.45.650(e)(2).'M The court
949. L at 433. The court determined that the items removed were "fixtures"
by applying a three-factor test outlined in Hayes v. Alaska Juneau Forest
Industries, Inc., 748 P.2d 332, 336 (Alaska 1988). Under this test, the court
considered (1) the manner in which the items were attached to the property, (2)
the adaptability of the items "to the use to which the realty is applied," and (3) the
intention of the party making the attachment. K & L Distributors, 908 P.2d at
432.
950. 889 P.2d 604 (Alaska 1995).
951. Id. at 607. The ordinance at issue, KENAI PENINSULA BOROUGH
ORDINANCE, AK., § 5.18.130(B), provides in relevant part:
Any person acquiring an ownership interest in an ongoing business...
whether by purchase, foreclosure, or otherwise, shall be liable for the
payment of taxes, penalties and interest accruing and unpaid to the
borough on account of operation of the business by the former owner.
889 P.2d at 605 (quoting KENAI PENINSULA BOROUGH ORDINANCE, AK.,
§ 5.18.130(B)).
952. Alaska Statutes section 29.45.650(e) provides:
(e) A borough may provide for the creation, recording, and notice of a
lien on real or personal property to secure the payment of a sales and use
tax, and the interest, penalties, and administration costs in the event of
delinquency. When recorded, the sales tax lien has priority over all other
liens except (1) liens for property taxes and special assessments; (2) liens
that were perfected before the recording of the sales tax lien for amounts
actually advanced before the recording of the sales tax lien; (3) mech-
anics' and materialmen's liens.., recorded before the recording of the
sales tax lien.
ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.650(e)(2) (1992).
953. Id
954. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 889 P.2d at 606.
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reasoned that abrogation of the lien priorities was neither specifi-
cally allowed under title 29 of the Alaska Statutes nor "necessarily
or fairly implied in or incident to the purpose of all powers and
functions conferred" therein.955 The court refused to rule on
whether a municipality could adopt a successor liability ordinance
consistent with the successor's perfected lien priority.1
6
In United States v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough,5 7 the su-
preme court held that real properties foreclosed upon by state or
federal agencies and held for resale are subject to local property
taxation as properties "retained as an investment" under Alaska
Statutes section 29.45.030(a)(1)(B).958  The Federal Farmers
Home Administration ("FFHA") challenged Alaska boroughs'
property tax assessments on properties that had been foreclosed
upon by FFHA, arguing that the FFHA had not retained the
properties for investment.9  The court disagreed, noting that the
agency makes an investment in the property by loaning money on
the real property." The court concluded that foreclosure and
resale of property is a method used by the FFHA to protect these
investments. Thus, property held for resale comes within the
definition of "retained as an investment."96 '
XIV. TORTS
In Hawks v. State,'6 the Alaska Supreme Court declined to
impose liability on the state for negligence in identifying the
remains of a murder victim.96 The court upheld the superior
court's grant of summary judgment to the state in a suit resulting
from a five-year delay in identifying the remains of appellant
Hawks's daughter.964 The court held that Hawks failed to state
a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress because the
state police did not owe her a duty of care to conduct its investiga-
955. Id. (citing Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Howard, 608 P.2d 32, 33-34
(Alaska 1980)).
956. Id. at 607 n.8.
957. 906 P.2d 1386 (Alaska 1995).
958. Id. at 1391.
959. Id at 1386-87.
960. Id. at 1389.
961. Id.
962. 908 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1995).
963. Id. at 1017.
964. Id. at 1015.
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tion non-negligently.9" The court determined that, although
injury to the plaintiff was foreseeable, the public consequences of
imposing a duty strongly militated against doing so.9' 6 The court
noted that imposing liability would prompt a torrent of litigation
concerning body identifications and would result in the diversion of
police resources from other projects and investigations. 67
In Zok v. State,9" the supreme court held that it constitutes
plain error for a court to fail to give a nominal damages instruction
to the jury in a false arrest case.969 Moreover, the court held that
this type of error is reviewable even when the victim of false arrest
does not object until after the jury has retired.970 The court noted
that recovery of nominal damages is important for the fact, not the
amount, of the award.97' However, the court held that because
the error could be corrected by the court as a matter of law and
because there would be no harm in correcting the verdict after the
jury had been discharged, a new trial was not necessary.9 72
Instead, the court remanded the case for entry of a nominal
damage award of one dollar.973
In Burcina v. City of Ketchikan, 74 the supreme court re-
affirmed the public policy principle that bars a person who has
been convicted of a crime from imposing liability on others for the
consequences of that antisocial conduct.975 The plaintiff was
undergoing outpatient mental health care with a department of the
City of Ketchikan when he set fire to the city's mental health drop-
in center.9 76 After being convicted of arson, the plaintiff filed suit
against the mental health clinic claiming he received negligent
treatment, which aggravated his mental illness and caused him to
965. Id. at 1016-17.
966. Ild.
967. Id. at 1017.
968. 903 P.2d 574 (Alaska 1995).
969. Id. at 578.
970. Id.
971. Id.
972. Id. at 579.
973. Id.
974. 902 P.2d 817 (Alaska 1995).
975. I. at 821.
976. IL at 819.
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set the fire.9" The court found that the plaintiff's claim was
barred by public policy.97
In Gunderson v. University of Alaska,979 the supreme court
refined its application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,9s° which
immunizes litigants from antitrust liability where they have
attempted to influence governmental processes to a competitor's
disadvantage. The supreme court determined that a party's
commission of misrepresentation or fraud during the judicial
process does not automatically render its lawsuit a
"sham"--defined as a mere attempt to interfere directly with the
business relationships of a competitor-which precludes Noerr-
Pennington immunity.98 1 Rather, the court ruled that courts must
still apply the two-part Columbia Pictures test9 in order to
determine whether the party's lawsuit constitutes a "sham."9"
Under the Columbia Pictures test, a party is denied immunity if its
lawsuit (1) is "objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits"9" and (2)
conceals "an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor."9
Gunderson had brought suit against Alaska Railroad Corpora-
tion ("ARC"), claiming that it had tortiously interfered with its
contract to deliver coal to the University of Alaska when it
protested against and secured the nullification of the contract
through an administrative hearing. Gunderson argued that ARC
engaged in fraud and misrepresentation at the hearing, thereby
automatically rendering its protest a "sham." The court rejected
this argument and followed the decision of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's in Liberty Investors, Inc. v.
Magnuson,986 in holding that a party alleging fraud and misrepre-
977. Id
978. Id.
979. 902 P.2d 323 (Alaska 1995).
980. See Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965).
981. Gunderson, 902 P.2d at 329.
982. See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
983. Gunderson, 902 P.2d at 328.
984. Id.
985. Id. (quoting Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. at 144).
986. 12 F.3d 155 (9th Cir. 1993).
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sentation in the course of litigation must still satisfy the Columbia
Pictures test to deny its adversary immunity." The Alaska
Supreme Court found that Gunderson's allegations failed the test,
because the success of ARC's protest showed its legitimacy.9"'
The court therefore upheld the lower court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of ARC.
In Estate of Arrowwood v. State,989 the supreme court held
that Alaska's failure to close an icy stretch of highway was a
"discretionary function" for which the state is immune from tort
liability under Alaska Statutes section 90.50.250(1). 90 In order
to determine whether discretionary function immunity was
applicable, the court applied a "planning level-operational test"99'
under which immunity applies if the formulation of policy (plan-
ning) is involved. Immunity does not apply if the implementation
of policy (an operational decision) is involved.9 2  The court
reasoned that, in the case of a road closure, an official is making a
decision on the scene rather than carrying out a predetermined
policy. Thus, the official was engaged in policy formulation, not
policy implementation, and discretionary function immunity
arose.
993
The court also held that the superior court did not abuse its
discretion by excluding evidence relating to the effect of budget
reductions upon the level of highway maintenance.994 Because
budget decisions are also discretionary functions, the court
reasoned they were immune from judicial inquiry and, thus, the
evidence was properly excluded.995
In Sweet v. Sisters of Providence in Washington,9 96 the su-
preme court held that in a medical malpractice case, a rebuttable
presumption of medical negligence and causation is raised against
the defendant if the defendant negligently alters or loses medical
records important to the plaintiff's malpractice claim. Moreover,
this rebuttable presumption operates to shift the burden of proof
987. Gunderson, 902 P.2d at 329.
988. Id.
989. 894 P.2d 642 (Alaska 1995).
990. Id. at 646; ALAsKA STAT. § 09.50.250(1) (1994).
991. Arrowwood, 894 P.2d at 645.
992. Id. at 644-45.
993. Id. at 645-46.
994. Id. at 646.
995. Id.
996. 895 P.2d 484 (Alaska 1995).
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to the defendant to prove the nonexistence of the facts pre-
sumed.9" In this case, Jacob Sweet, the newborn child of Gary
and Beverly Sweet, allegedly sustained brain damage caused by the
negligence of the hospital and doctor that treated Jacob.98 The
hospital was unable to locate several hospital records that the
Sweets claimed were critical to their case.99
The supreme court adopted the approach of the Florida
Supreme Court in Trust v. Valcin,1' ° and held that the rebuttable
presumption arises if the court determines that the missing records
are important to the plaintiff's case and the records are missing due
to the negligence or fault of the defendant."1 ' The court deter-
mined that although the trial court shifted the burden with respect
to the issue of whether the defendant had breached a duty, it
incorrectly failed to shift the burden relating to the causation issue.
However, the supreme court determined that the lower court's
error was harmless because the jury had found no breach of duty;
thus, the jury never reached the causation issue."
The supreme court also held that before a judge can instruct
a jury that a regulation3 provides a basis for holding a doctor
per se negligent for failing to get written consent, the judge must
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the regulation is
"obscure" and unknown in the medical community." °  During
this hearing, the trial court must determine whether the alleged
conduct falls within the scope of the statute or regulation by
applying the criteria set out in section 286 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.' However, the court noted that even if the
section 286 criteria were met, the court might refuse to find the
statute or regulation to be the basis for per se negligence if the
statute or regulation were "so obscure, unknown, outdated, or
arbitrary as to make its adoption as a standard of reasonable care
inequitable."' °6  The supreme court remanded the case to the
997. Id. at 490-92.
998. Id. at 486.
999. Id. at 487.
1000. 507 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1987).
1001. Sweet, 895 P.2d at 491.
1002. Id. at 492.
1003. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 12.120 (July 1993)(requiring informed
consent to be in writing).
1004. Sweet, 895 P.2d at 494.
1005. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965); Sweet, 895 P.2d at 493.
1006. Sweet, 895 P.2d at 493.
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trial court for a determination of whether the regulation at issue
was "obscure.""
In Myers v. Robertson, °° the supreme court held that
according to Alaska's wrongful death statute,' 9 sufficient adver-
sity existed for a court to have subject matter jurisdiction over a
claim by an estate in a wrongful death action against the estate's
beneficiaries.0 10 The case established as a matter of first impres-
sion in Alaska that in a wrongful death action the estate's benefi-
ciaries are not the "true plaintiffs" where any potential recovery
will be paid to the estate and not directly to individual beneficia-
ries.'01' The court reasoned that its conclusion did not violate
the public policy that a negligent party should not benefit from his
wrongdoing because the negligent beneficiaries would be deemed
to have renounced their right to recovery according to Alaska
Statutes section 13.11.295.""2
In Chizmar v. Mackie,013 the supreme court reversed the
superior court's holding that a plaintiff can recover damages for
negligent infliction of emotional distress only when the negligent
behavior resulted in an accompanying physical injury.1'14 While
the superior court's decision was consistent with the traditional
rule, the supreme court decided to abandon the physical injury
requirement in situations where the "damages are foreseeable and
severe, and arise from circumstances in which the defendant owes
the plaintiff a preexisting duty to refrain from causing dis-
tress.' 015  Applying this standard, the court found that a
reasonable jury could conclude that a misdiagnosis of AIDS could
foreseeably cause severe emotional distress and that a doctor had
a duty of care to a patient.01 6 Because Dr. Scott Mackie owed
this duty of care to Savitri Chizmar and misdiagnosed Chizmar with
1007. lIL The supreme court also found that plaintiff had no claim for negligent
spoliation of evidence because the burden shifting with respect to the issues of
breach of duty and causation was a "sufficient" remedy for the loss of the medical
records. l at 493.
1008. 891 P.2d 199 (Alaska 1995).
1009. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580 (1962).
1010. Myers, 891 P.2d at 206.
1011. Id. at 205.
1012. Id. at 207; ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.295 (1984).
1013. 896 P.2d 196 (Alaska 1995).
1014. Id. at 201.
1015. Id. at 214.
1016. Id. at 205.
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AIDS, the court remanded the claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.0 17
In the Estate of Day v. Willis,1018 the supreme court held that
a police officer engaged in a high speed chase did not have a legal
duty of care to protect the suspects involved in the chase from their
own actions. 0 9  The court examined whether public policy
established a legal duty of care by reviewing the considerations it
had set forth in D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School
District.~" The court determined that no legal duty existed
despite a close nexus between the pursuit of the offender and the
risk of an accident.' The creation of such a duty would violate
public policy by, among other things, failing to take into account
the blameworthiness of the offenders' conduct."
In Palmer G. Lewis Co. v. ARCO Chemical Co.," the
supreme court refined the rule of Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage
and Sales, Inc."~4 to conclude that the supplier of a defective
product who is liable on a theory of strict liability is entitled to
indemnity from the manufacturer of the product if the supplier can
prove that the product was defective when it was acquired from the
manufacturer." Heritage held that a supplier is "entitled to
indemnity when it settles a case if it would have been entitled to
indemnity had it tried the case and lost.'1 6  However, the
ARCO Chemical court pointed out that only the issue of attorney's
fees was before the Heritage court; the manufacturer's indemnity
liability had already been established." z7 The court distinguished
1017. Id.
1018. 897 P.2d 78 (Alaska 1995).
1019. Id. at 82.
1020. 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981). The considerations were the following:
The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to
the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent
of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the community
of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and
the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Id at 555.
1021. Estate of Day, 897 P.2d at 82.
1022. Id.
1023. 904 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1995).
1024. 604 P.2d 1059 (Alaska 1984).





ARCO Chemical from Heritage because in ARCO Chemical, the
manufacturer's liability had not been established. Therefore, the
court concluded that the supplier would not be entitled to indem-
nity under Heritage unless it could show that the manufacturer had
sold it defective products."°
The court also recognized for the first time that the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflicts is persuasive in resolving conflicts of
laws issues relating to contracts' ° 9  Applying Restatement
principles, the court looked to the places of contracting, negotiation
and performance of the contract. Because all three occurred in
Washington State, the court concluded that Washington law
governed the contract."
XV. TRUSTS AND ESTATES
In In re Estate of Evans,'° the Alaska Supreme Court held
that notice of the disallowance of a claim against an estate must be
"clear and unequivocal ' °32 to bar it under Alaska Statutes
section 13.16.475(a). °3  The estate's attorney sent a letter to
certain claimants stating that more information was needed to
advise the personal representative in making a determination of the
claim.' 34 The letter also suggested a disallowance, stating that
"it would be safer to disallow the claim" and mentioning that the
claim would be barred after sixty days under Alaska Statutes
section 13.16.475(a).'1 5 The court stated that the letter did not
provide clear and unequivocal notice because it "[did] not contain
a 'flat out rejection,' but rather contemplated further consideration
1028. Id.
1029. Id. at 1227.
1030. Id.
1031. 901 P.2d 1138 (Alaska 1995).
1032. Id. at 1140.
1033. Section 13.16.475(a) states in relevant part:
[T]he personal representative may mail a notice to any claimant stating
that the claim has been disallowed .... Every claim which is disallowed
in whole or in part by the personal representative is barred so far as not
allowed unless the claimant files a petition for allowance in the court or
commences a proceeding against the personal representative not later
than 60 days after the mailing of the notice of disallowance or partial
allowance if the notice warns the claimant of the impending bar.
ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.475(a) (1994).




of the... claim."' ° 6 The court also rejected the estate's conten-
tion that the claimants should have been put on inquiry notice,
stating that such an argument would frustrate the purpose of the
statute by encouraging estates to hint at disallowance without
clearly communicating it.' 7  The court remanded the case to
determine whether the claimants had actual notice of the disallow-
ance, reasoning that if the claimants had actual notice, the claim
would be time-barred.1°3s
In First National Bank v. State Office of Public Advocacy,1"9
the supreme court affirmed the superior court's decision that a
court-appointed guardian for the settlor of a trust could exercise
the power reserved by the settlor to remove the trustee upon
written notice." The Office of Public Advocacy ("OPA")
appointed by court order as the settlor's guardian, obtained a court
order removing First National Bank of Anchorage as trustee.1°"
First National unsuccessfully argued that the order was void
because the statutory procedures for removal of a trustee had not
been followed."~2 The supreme court stated that under the
terms of the trust and the previous order appointing OPA as the
settlor's guardian, OPA had explicit authority to remove the trustee
without application to the court. Therefore, the statutory proce-
dures for removing a trustee did not apply.Y43
1036. Id. at 1142.
1037. Id. at 1143.
1038. Id.
1039. 902 P.2d 330 (Alaska 1995).
1040. Id. at 334.
1041. Id. at 331.
1042. The court noted that Alaska Statutes section 13.06.110 "vests the superior
court with exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings initiated by interested parties
concerning the internal affairs of trusts." First National Bank, 902 P.2d at 334
(citing ALASKA STAT. § 13.06.110 (1985)). The proceeding is initiated by a filing
of a petition under Alaska Statutes section 13.36.035 and giving notice under
Alaska Statutes Section 13.06.110. ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.36.035, 13.06.110 (1985).
1043. First National Bank, 902 P.2d at 334. The court relied on Alaska Statutes
section 13.36.035, which states in relevant part: "The management and distribution
of a trust estate ... shall proceed expeditiously consistently with the terms of the
trust, free of judicial intervention and without order, approval or other action of
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Dominish v. State, 907 P.2d 487 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission did
not err in refusing to consider the aggregate significance of (1)
a fishing license applicant's medical problems and (2) the fact
that the applicant's application was one day late when the
Commission rejected the applicant's request for "past participa-
tion points," which would have enhanced the applicant's chances
of receiving certain fishing licenses).
Glascock v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 890 P.2d 65 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that the Alaska Division of Motor Vehicles properly
used prior a conviction for driving while intoxicated ("DWI"),
which was reflected in an authenticated copy of a motorist's out-
of-state driving record, to enhance the period of the motorist's
administrative license revocation for a subsequent DWI offense
committed in Alaska).
BUSINESS LAW
University of Alaska v. Thomas Architectural Prod., 907 P.2d 448
(Alaska 1995)
(holding that, under Washington State law, failure of a dissolved
corporation to comply with windup requirements makes it
susceptible to suits by known creditors who did not receive
notice of the dissolution).
Neal & Co. v. Association of Village Council Presidents Regional
Hous. Auth., 895 P.2d 497 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that contract language placed responsibility for the
provision of electrical power during construction on a contractor
and that a general contractor was not an intended third-party
beneficiary of a contract between the Village Council Presidents
Regional Housing Authority and the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development).
FAMILY LAW
A.H. v. W.P, 896 P.2d 240 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that (1) a trial court did not improperly rely on stigma
related to a mother's mental impairment in modifying a child
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custody order and (2) an order requiring the mother to pay child
support based on her earning capacity prior to the manifestation
of her mental disability was an abuse of discretion).
A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that (1) the absence of a "psychological parent" bond
is not, standing alone, enough to show the destruction of the
parent-child relationship, which constitutes abandonment, and
(2) parental rights cannot be terminated due to the incarceration
of a parent because incarceration does not show that the child
is in need of aid as a result of "parental conduct which is likely
to continue").
Davila v. Davila, 908 P.2d 1027 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that superior court had not abused its discretion in
failing to award a wife spousal support or attorney's fees and in
assigning her the cost of her medical expenses).
McQueary v. McQueary,.902 P2d 1326 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that a superior court's calculation of the present value
of a marital ranch was clearly erroneous).
McQuade v. McQuade, 901 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1995)
(affirming a superior court's decision to award child custody to
plaintiff's ex-wife, even though she had decided to move out of
the state).
Moore v. Moore, 893 P.2d 1268 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that a mother's monthly mortgage payments could be
included in her family expenses when calculating the father's
child support obligation).
Morris v. Morris, 908 P.2d 425 (Alaska 1995)
(denying relief from the assignment of 90% of an ex-husband's
federal workers' compensation benefits to his former wife).
Nass v. Seaton, 904 P.2d 412 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that gifts to a father from his parents should not be
considered as income when determining a father's child support
obligation).
Waggoner v. Foster, 904 P.2d 1234 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that in determining whether to modify a divorce decree
to reflect the parties' agreement that the ex-husband could claim
the parties' five children as dependents for income tax purposes,
the trial court must consider whether such an arrangement was
in the best interests of the children).
Wright v. Wright, 904 P.2d 403 (Alaska 1995)




In re Estate of Katchatag, 907 P.2d 458 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that a fee-sharing arrangement between two attorneys
was not enforceable because it was not in writing and was not
approved by the client).
In re McNally, 901 P.2d 415 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that a district attorney's failure to appear at a court
hearing was a violation of Rule 3.4(c) of the Alaska Rules of
Professional Conduct for which a monetary sanction under
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 95(b) was appropriate).
Gamble v. Northstore Partnership, 907 P.2d 477 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that a superior court abused its discretion when it
refused to grant property owners additional time to oppose an
easement owner's summary judgment motion).
Shade v. Co & Anglo Alaska Serv. Corp., 901 P.2d 434 (Alaska
1995)
(holding that summary judgment was improperly granted in a
negligence case where the defendant failed to show the absence
of a factual dispute as to whether defendant breached a duty of
care to the plaintiff).
EMPLOYMENT LAW
Alaska Pulp Corp. v. Trading Union, 896 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that when an employee injures his shoulder while
working for an employer, subsequently changes jobs and
reinjures the shoulder while working for a second employer, the
first employer remains responsible for paying workers' compen-
sation benefits associated with the initial injury, and the second
employer must pay benefits only insofar as they relate to the
reinjury).
Bishop v. Municipality of Anchorage, 899 P.2d 149 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that an employee's insubordination on an inconsequen-
tial matter gave an employer just cause to dismiss the employee
and was not a pretext for dismissing the employee for exercising
his First Amendment rights).
Cluff v. Nana-Marriott, 892 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that in a workers' compensation case, the presumption
of compensability applies to the general employer rather than a
prospective employer, even where the injury was caused by
testing administered by the prospective employer).
Cozzen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 907 P.2d 473 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that a plaintiff's failure to exhaust all of the contractual




Haroldsen v. Omni Enter., 901 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that an employee terminated during a reduction in the
employer's work force who sues the employer for race discrimi-
nation need not establish as part of a prima facie case of pretext
that he or she possessed greater qualifications than a retained
employee).
Helmuth v. University of Alaska-Fairbanks, 908 P.2d 1017 (Alaska
1995)
(holding that an administrative hearing officer's finding of
insubordination justifying termination, based on employee's
refusal to write a memorandum, was supported by substantial
evidence).
Jonathan v. Doyan Drilling, Inc., 890 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that the statute of limitations on workers' compensation
claims is not tolled until the employer responds to the em-
ployee's written request for benefits).
Prazak v. Alaska Local No. 1, Int'l Union of Bricklayers and Allied
Craftsmen, 904 P.2d 428 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that cases retain fast track status after consolidation if
they are assigned that status prior to consolidation, and they may
not be dismissed by a court without following the mandatory
dismissal procedures for fast track cases).
CRIMINAL LAW
Anderson v. State, 904 P.2d 433 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that counting simultaneous convictions of prior multiple
felonies as separate convictions for presumptive sentencing
purposes does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Alaska Constitution).
Beltz v. State, 895 P.2d 513 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that evidence of a wife's violent behavior toward her
husband when he disputed the custody of their child was
improperly excluded in a child sexual abuse case against the
husband, as it was highly probative impeachment evidence of
wife's motive to encourage the child to fabricate stories of
molestation by husband).
Clum v. State, 893 P.2d 1277 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that a prosecutor's closing argument gave rise to
grounds for reversible error where the prosecutor suggested that
the defendant's failure to call a witness was evidence of decep-
tion by the defense with respect to other evidence).
DeJesus v. State, 897 P.2d 608 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that a defendant made a prima facie case of ineffectual
assistance of counsel by showing that counsel provided defendant
with incorrect sentencing information).
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Evan v. State, 899 P.2d 926 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that with a relaxed hearsay rule in sentencing, the state
may rely on hearsay evidence unless the defendant presents
testimony creating a real indication that the hearsay statements
are inaccurate).
Halberg v. State, 903 P.2d 1090 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that where defendant's Miranda rights are violated
during a first interview by police, statements made in subsequent
interviews are admissible if the decision to submit to those
interviews was made freely enough to remove the taint of the
Miranda violation in the first interview).
Harmon v. State, 908 P.2d 434 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that DNA evidence was properly admissible under the
Frye test and rejecting the argument that "population substruc-
tures" make the results unreliable).
Jordan v. State, 895 P.2d 994 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that evidence of prior criminal records of two passen-
gers in a stolen car, which the defendant argued would impeach
their statements that he was the driver, were properly excluded
where the passengers did not testify and their statements were
not offered as hearsay).
Kitchens v. State, 898 P.2d 443 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
(remanding case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing
where the trial court in imposing the original sentence mistaken-
ly believed that it had to impose consecutive sentences for two
sexual assaults when, in fact, it was in the court's discretion to
impose the sentences consecutively or concurrently).
Linton v. State, 901 P.2d 439 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
(declining to determine whether the court would adopt the same
interpretation of Alaska Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) as the U.S.
Supreme Court's interpretation of the corresponding federal rule
because the defendant failed to raise the issue in the trial court).
Nagasiak v. State, 890 P.2d 1134 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that (1) trial judges have substantial discretion when
evaluating sentencing goals and (2) the trial court had not
abused its discretion in imposing a sentence of nine years
imprisonment with six years suspended on a defendant convicted
of second-degree child abuse).
Simmons v. State, 899 P.2d 931 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that double jeopardy barred the entry of judgment
against a defendant on more than one count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm where the evidence did not show two
separate violations but rather one continuous possession of the
firearm).
Smith v. State, 892 P.2d 202 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that a sentencing order may not grant double credit for
time served against sentences that had to run consecutively but
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that the trial court had authority to reduce the sentence taking
into account the additional time to be spent in prison because
the credit could be counted only once).
Toomer v. State, 890 P.2d 598 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that in a trial for theft, evidence of a defendant's
cocaine conviction introduced to establish motive for the theft
was improperly admitted where a "particularized connection"
between the drug use and the charged offense had not been
established).
Turpin v. State, 890 P.2d 1128 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that a defendant waives his ability to claim mistrial by
failing to object to events occurring during a trial until after an
adverse verdict is returned).
PROPERTY
Bowman v. Blair, 889 P.2d 1069 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that a mother seeking the return of property allegedly
owned by her adult son who died intestate had the burden of
proving that the decedent owned the property at the time of his
death and determining that a probate master's findings relating
to the ownership of such property was not clearly erroneous).
Carr-Gottstein Properties v. State, 899 P.2d 136 (Alaska 1995)(per
curiam).
Keener v. State, 889 P.2d 1063 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that the right-of-way for roads on lands conveyed by
the government must be fifty feet, even though a subsequently
issued patent called for an easement of only thirty feet).
Marlow v. Municipality of Anchorage, 889 P.2d 599 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that an Anchorage rezoning ordinance does not require
a developer to extend utilities to the boundary of adjacent
property).
TAX
Katmailand, Inc. v. Lake & Peninsula Borough, 904 P.2d 397
(Alaska 1995)
(holding that a borough's tax does not violate federal or state
equal protection or due process guarantees where the tax is
imposed on professional guides on a per-visitor basis and on
lodge owners on a per-room basis).
TORTS
Mount Juneau Enter. v. Juneau Empire, 891 P.2d 829 (Alaska
1995)
(holding that a developer who sought public approval for a
construction project is a "public figure" as to the project and
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must show actual malice in order to prevail on a defamation
claim brought against the author of a newspaper article that
described matters relating to the project in an unfavorable light).
TRUSTS AND ESTATES
Carroll v. Carroll, 903 P.2d 579 (Alaska 1995)
(holding that an estate beneficiary waived her objection to the
sale of stock in a closely held corporation by failing timely to
oppose the motion for approval of the sale).

